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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the last decades, the world trading system has been the object of progressive and
profound evolution. On the one hand, globalization and the pervasive influence of the
international economy have involved all the world countries, due to a trade liberaliza-
tion process. According to recent World Trade Organization statistics, trade flows have
dramatically increased in the last 20-30 years, with the value of world merchandising
exports growing by more than 7 percent per year since 1980 (WTO (2013)). An impor-
tant factor influencing these dynamics has been the reduction in trade barriers, with the
WTO and other trade arrangements being successful in reducing tariffs and restrictive
non-tariff measures such as quotas. On the other hand, there has been a shift in the
focus of trade protection. The decrease in border measures has revealed a new and more
diverse category of policy instruments: the numerous regulations enacted by governments
to protect their citizens’ health and the environment in which they live (Trebilcock and
Howse (2005)). These measures are also referred to as “behind-the-border” regulations,
since they are imposed internally on the domestic economy (Baldwin et al. (2000), Staiger
(2012)). Today, such regulations represent a large proportion of the broader category
defined as “Non-Tariff Measures” (NTMs). The proliferation of regulatory measures such
1
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as product labeling, food inspection and environmental policies has expanded the debate
on international trade, in which consumers’ associations and environmental organizations
have assumed a leading role. Indeed, these organized groups fear that trade liberaliza-
tion will lead to a decrease in standards for both their own countries and international
trade partners. Two significant manifestations of these concerns have been the recent
negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP)1, in which consumers’ associations and environmentalists
have played an important role, participating in the debate on standards, health risks and
regulations. Vogel (2009) describes the involvement of environmentally concerned individ-
uals in the trade debate as “eco-protectionism”, referring to the fact that some groups of
citizens prioritize environmental protection over other policy goals, such as trade openness
and production expansion. Indeed, an important concern of environmentalists is that, as
countries move forward toward liberalization, businesses will be free to relocate where
environmental regulations are laxer, and this will progressively create an incentive for all
states to decrease environmental protection. This concept has been defined by the litera-
ture as the “pollution haven hypothesis”, namely the idea that polluting industries will be
attracted by those jurisdictions where regulations are less strict. Although empirical evi-
dence on this theory is mixed (see Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for a review), there
exist some works finding confirmation of a pollution haven effect. One of the most recent
papers studying this phenomenon is the work by Broner et al. (2012), who find a causal
relationship between environmental regulations and industries’ comparative advantage.
Given the above dynamics, it appears to be important to theoretically and empirically
investigate whether and how consumers’ concerns about safety and the environment shape
governments’ decisions about trade policy and environmental regulations. Indeed, despite
consumers’ associations and environmental groups not having the same financial resources
as business interest groups, they can represent a powerful lobbying force for the govern-
ment, since they act by spreading information to the general public and by increasing
voters’ awareness.
1The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States (until 23 January 2017) and
Vietnam. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed trade agreement
between the European Union and the United States.
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As far as international trade is concerned, the above research question adds to a large
theoretical and empirical literature studying the political economy of trade policy (see
Rodrik (1995) and Gawande and Krishna (2003) for surveys). The aim of this strand
of literature is the study of “endogenous” trade policy determination, which consists of
identifying the main political factors leading government to set policies that diverge from
welfare maximization. Numerous works studying the political economy of trade policies
have focused on the role of interest groups, which are able to exert influence on politicians.
In particular, policy makers are predicted to be influenced by domestic industrial groups,
lobbying the government to obtain higher protection against competition coming from im-
ports. The influence of lobbying on government’s decisions has been theorized by Hillman
(1982), Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and, more recently, by Grossman and Helpman (1994),
whose “Protection for Sale” framework occupies center stage in the theoretical and em-
pirical political economy literature2. In the latter framework, politically organized sectors
influence politicians through campaign contributions. Politicians, in turn, maximize an
objective function weighing political contributions from industries and consumers’ welfare.
A similar structure has been applied to environmental policy by a strand of literature
focused on the political economy determinants of regulations related to the environment.
These models, summarized in Oates and Portney (2003) and Olper (2017), intend the
political process as conditioned by two opposing interest groups, the “environmentalist”
lobby and the “industrialist” lobby, the latter being represented by polluting industries
aiming at lowering regulations which would inhibit their productive activities (see, for
example Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998) and Yu (2005)). The interesting feature of this
class of models for the contexts presented above is that they include the “disutility of
pollution”, namely the fact that consumers - or, at least, that fraction of the population
who is particularly sensitive towards the environment - can perceive lax environmental
expenditures as causing harm.
My dissertation, “Essays in the Political Economy of Trade and Environmental Poli-
2These lobbying models, also called “interest groups models”, find their roots in the collective action
theory by Olson (1965) and in the theory of competition among interest groups by Becker (1983). The
literature on the political economy of trade policies is also related to the theory of economic regulation
by Stigler (1971), who showed that regulations are set to improve the economic status of industry groups.
Moreover, the inclusion of voters’ welfare in the government’s objective function draws from the median
voter theory by Downs (1957) and from the paper by Peltzman (1987).
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cies”, adds to the above literature, bringing about new theoretical and empirical evidence.
The first chapter of the thesis, “Protection for Sale with Consumer Externality: An Ap-
plication to Non-Tariff Measures”, consists of an extension of the Grossman and Helpman
(1994) “Protection for Sale” model, which is augmented by the inclusion of consumer ex-
ternality and applied to NTMs such as standards and technical barriers to trade. The
second chapter, “The Role of Political Ideology, Lobbying and Electoral Incentives in
Decentralized U.S. State Support of the Environment”, focuses instead on environmen-
tal policies and empirically investigates their political economy determinants, studying
in particular the political ideology of policy makers, lobbying activities, and - to a mi-
nor extent - electoral incentives. Both works focus on the United States: while the first
chapter studies non-tariff measures imposed by the US on all the world trade partners,
and considers trade policy formation at the federal government level, the second chapter
investigates state-level environmental expenditures. The United States represent an ideal
case study for this research. Indeed, thanks to a mandatory lobby register, U.S. lobbying
data are available at both federal and state level, listing the amount of contributions given
to candidates and other lobbying expenditures incurred by interest groups3.
The first chapter of my dissertation brings to existing literature two main elements
of novelty. First, the application of the “Protection for Sale” framework to recent (2014)
non-tariff measures is new, since the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework had only
been tested on border non-tariff barriers4. The specific nature of NTMs, which are set
with the purpose of safeguarding consumers’ well being as opposed to the stated aim of
protecting the internal markets, puts into question the original predictions by Grossman
and Helpman (1994), making it interesting to apply the model to recent data. Secondly,
the presented theoretical framework includes the externality of consumers in the main
model equation, allowing investigation into whether industries where attention towards
health and environmental issues is greater are more protected. Results from the empirical
application of the model provide evidence of higher NTM coverage in organized sectors,
showing that lobbies are still able to influence the government and obtain higher protection.
3Transparency rules regarding lobbying activities were defined by the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act
4Previous empirical papers, such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)
and Bombardini (2008), used a database on non-tariff barriers from 1983, including mainly border measures
such as quotas, anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
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Moreover, sectors where consumers are more sensitive towards safety and the environment
turn out to be covered by a higher number of NTMs, confirming that consumers’ safeguard
is a relevant political economy motivation for trade protection.
The second chapter of my thesis adds new evidence to the theoretical and empirical
political economy literature applied to environmental policies. A theoretical framework
is outlined, where U.S. states’ environmental expenditures are influenced by governors’
ideology, lobbying and the median voter’s preferences. Both ideology and lobbying have
rarely been considered by the political economy literature about environmental policies,
representing elements of novelty in the framework. The empirical analysis focuses on gov-
ernors’ parties as a proxy for ideology, and investigates whether states’ legislatures invest
a higher proportion of the budget on the environment when a Democratic governor is in
charge as opposed to a Republican one. Moreover, the study tests whether governors who
are subject to higher lobbying pressures deviate from their own ideology to accommodate
interest groups. To conduct this analysis, a 35-year (1980-2014) database is used including
yearly environmental expenditures by state, as well as states’ and governors’ characteris-
tics. The impact of governors’ party affiliation on environmental policies is connected to
the dynamics, explained above, of increasing involvement of voters in the policy debate.
Indeed, as the general public develops more awareness towards environmental problems,
policy makers are also asked to provide clearer responses and take stronger measures on
these issues. As Dunlap (2001) points out, these dynamics have lead, at least in the
United States, to a progressive parties’ polarization on environmental issues since 1970.
This hypothesis is confirmed by the main results of the study, showing that, under Demo-
cratic governors, environmental expenditures are on average higher than under Republican
governors. Although evidence that parties matter for policy outcomes has been provided
by several works within the political economy literature (see, for example, Reed (2006)
and Beland (2015)), the present study is the first showing that such effect exists on en-
vironmental policies. Moreover, it turns out that Democrats deviate from their political
ideology when they are subject to lobbying pressures from polluting industries, as well as
from environmentalist groups. This finding is in line with the special interest groups mod-
els focused on environmental policies, such as the works by Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt
(1998) and the lobbying model by Yu (2005). Given such results, it is advisable to con-
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sider lobbying and electoral incentives together when investigating the political economy
determinants of environmental regulations.
Overall, my dissertation expands current political economy literature on regulatory
measures, emphasizing the role of voters and its interaction with industries’ interests
within the policy formation process. Given the complexity of the issue, the plurality of
actors involved and the multiplicity of policy instruments used by governments in domestic
and international policies, such a work could stimulate new questions for future research
and lead to further investigation.
CHAPTER 2
Protection for Sale with Consumer Externality:
Evidence from Non-Tariff Measures1
1This Chapter is based on the paper “Protection for Sale with Consumer Externality: Evidence from
Non-Tariff Measures” by Lucia Pacca (L.A.S.E.R. Doctoral School, Universities of Milan, Pavia and Bres-
cia).
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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the effect of lobbying and consumer externality on the pattern
of protection through non-tariff barriers to trade (NTMs) across United States manufac-
turing sectors. We first extend the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model, “Protection
for Sale”, incorporating consumer externality. Externality is intended, in our framework,
as the concern of a government for consumers’ safety and the environment, which should
result in increased protection through standards and technical measures. In our model,
externality adds to interest groups’ lobbying activity in determining the increase in non-
tariff measures. We test the predictions of our model using a novel database on 2014 stock
of NTMs. We measure political organization of industries through lobbying expenditures
data, and we identify sectors where government cares the most about consumers’ well-
being using media sources. Our results suggest that both pressure from interest groups
and concerns about safety and environmental issues lead to an increase in the pattern of
protection across US manufacturing sectors.
CHAPTER 2. PROTECTION FOR SALE WITH CONSUMER EXTERNALITY 9
2.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, besides a general trend of trade protection reduction, the
world has witnessed a change in the pattern of protection of countries. Indeed, tariffs
have progressively ceded their place to non-tariff measures (NTMs). This category of
policies consists of a diverse and complex array of measures: besides direct restrictions to
import, such as quotas or anti-dumping measures, it includes so-called technical measures
(Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, SPS; and Technical Barriers to trade, TBT).
The latter category of measures have seen a particularly consistent increase in the last
years. Technical NTMs, by comparison with those manifestly employed as instruments
of commercial policy (the so called non-tariff barriers to trade, or NTBs), are also put
in place for consumers’ safeguard purposes, being often related to safety of products and
environmental protection (UNCTAD (2012)). Within international trade literature, it has
often been argued that NTMs are set as a substitute or complement to tariffs with a
similar protectionist purpose (see, for example, Hoekman and Nicita (2011) and Beverelli
et al. (2014)). However, in recent work, some authors have pointed out that technical
measures substantially differ from tariffs and NTBs, given their important function of
mitigating negative externalities and protecting consumers’ safety and the environment
(see Van Tongeren et al. (2009) and Beghin et al. (2015)). In this respect, as shown by
Beghin et al. (2015), NTMs are not always protectionist with regards to trade, but in
some cases they can even facilitate it, and enhance welfare. This happens when these
measures succeed in addressing negative externalities mitigation (or positive externalities
accentuation) purposes. If this is the case, consumers may perceive the quality of imports
protected by standards as higher, increasing their purchases or switching their preferences
towards these products.
The complexity and the different purposes of NTMs result from a heterogeneous set of
political economy determinants. The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model (“Protection
for Sale”), which has been applied and extended in several directions, shows how govern-
ment shapes tariffs (and non-tariff barriers) as a response to lobbies from the industry
on one side, and attention towards consumers’ welfare on the other. According to this
framework, interest groups from manufacturing sectors lobby the government asking for
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higher protection, while consumers are interested in loosening protection to have access
to lower priced goods. Being originally thought for tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as
quotas, the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model (GH hereafter) does not take consumer
externality into account. Some recent literature has taken steps to fill this gap. Swinnen
and Vandemoortele (2008), focusing on nutrition and health standards on food products,
develop a general political economy model that accounts for the “externality effect” of
standards. Yu (2005), who adapts the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model to the case
of environmental policy, integrates the disutility of pollution into the consumer’s utility
function, which is then taken into consideration by the government when having to set the
policy. These two models share a common element, namely the importance of risks for
consumers as a fundamental political economy determinant of standards and environmen-
tal regulations. Consumers’ preferences, which may be influenced by media or by specific
groups’ action (e.g. consumers’ associations), can be an important driver of the policies
decided by a government.
Despite the two models cited above representing a theoretical alternative to the tradi-
tional GH, no paper to date, to the best of our knowledge, has tested the impact of con-
sumer preferences (consumer externality) on the level of standards set by the government.
Our work attempts to fill the gap, by extending the traditional Grossman and Helpman
(1994) model to the inclusion of an externality component and by empirically testing such
extension. According to our framework, the externality is considered by the government
when consumers are sensitive to the impact that some products can have on their health,
safety or the environment. The fact that some products are associated with higher health
risks or potential environmental damages than others is considered as a determinant, to-
gether with lobbying pressures, of the pattern of protection across industries. We test such
teoretical framework on the United States, considering all manufacturing industries at a
detailed level of disaggregation (NAICS 6-digit). We use the most recent available data on
NTMs (2014 stock) and we define political organization based on lobbying expenditures
data from the Federal Election Commission. Applying the Grossman and Helpman (1994)
model on recent NTMs data is a novelty per se. Indeed, most of the empirical applications
based on the GH framework (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000), Gawande et al. (2006)) were carried out on non-tariff barriers data from
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1983. However, the pattern of protection has considerably changed since then, making
it interesting to study whether the “Protection for Sale” framework is still valid. More-
over, we build a more accurate measure of sectoral lobbying activity than the ones used
in previous works, using data on trade-related lobbying expenditures at a detailed level of
disaggregation. As a proxy for consumers’ externality, we construct a variable taken from
Lexis Nexis, a comprehensive database including articles from all the main newspapers,
journals and reviews from around the world. By classifying US news by sector and select-
ing the articles associated with topics such as “safety” and “environmental protection”,
we construct our externality variable. In our view, the attention of media towards safety,
health or environmental issues can be a proxy for consumer externality across products
and sectors. This is in line with some recent literature on the political economy of media
(see Prat and Stro¨mberg (2011)) arguing that media attention across issues creates a bias
in policy responses by influencing the government and raising attention.
The first finding coming out of our results is that the main prediction from the Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) model is still valid today, when recent lobbying data and non-
tariff measures are taken into account. Indeed, the weighted number of NTMs turns out
to be significantly higher in politically organized sectors (namely, when industries spend
a considerable amount of money for lobbying activities). In addition to this, we find that
consumer externality is an important determinant of the pattern of NTMs across sec-
tors: when consumers are more sensitive towards safety and potential risks coming from
products, the NTM prevalence ratio is, ceteris paribus, significantly higher. These results
suggest that NTMs are not only set by the government as a protectionist policy, but also
as a response to consumers’ concerns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Paragraph 2.2 reviews the literature
that is most connected to our work. Paragraph 2.3 presents our theoretical framework,
which consists of a modified version of the model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Para-
graphs 2.4 and 2.5 describe the empirical strategy and the econometric methodology used
in our empirical application, which is aimed at testing our theoretical model. Paragraph
2.7 presents and discusses the main results coming out of our empirical application, and
paragraph 2.8 draws some final remarks.
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2.2 Discussion of Related Literature
This paper relies on several strands of literature investigating the political economy de-
terminants of trade protection and studying the trade and welfare effects of NTMs.
Our theoretical framework is based on the model by Grossman and Helpman (1994),
which they call “Protection for sale”. In the GH framework, the government sets trade
policies (import and export taxes and subsidies) maximizing a weighted sum of social
welfare and contributions received by interest groups (lobbies), which represent domestic
industries’ interests. Lobbies give contributions to the government with the aim of raising
import taxes, sice they want to protect the sectors they represent from import competition.
According to the model, when an import-competing industry is politically organized, it is
able to “buy” protection and push the government to raise tariffs. By contrast, when an
industry in unorganized, the government will only take consumers’ welfare into account,
penalizing the internal sector with import subsidies. The Grossman and Helpman (1994)
model identifies three main determinants of protection: the level of import competition;
import demand elasticities - according to the Ramsey rule, goods with low import demand
elasticity are taxed more, since taxing high elasticity goods would bring about a bigger
welfare loss - and whether or not an industry is politically organized.
The GH model was first applied by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), who brought the main predictions by Grossman and Helpman
(1994) to an empirically testable equation. Their works use US political contributions data
from the 1980s, testing whether politically organized industries are affected by a different
pattern of protection with respect to unorganized sectors. Both works find support for the
predictions outlined by the theoretical model: everything else equal, the level of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) turns out to be higher in politically organized industries by contrast to
in unorganized ones.
The popularity of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework has remained un-
changed over time. In more recent years, the model has been modified in several directions.
The aim of these extensions has been to attenuate some sources of bias in the original GH
model, as well as to account for some aditional determinants of protection. Facchini et al.
(2006), for example, modified the model taking into account that NTBs, unlike tariffs,
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allow the government to only partially capture rents from protection. For this reason,
according to the authors, the coefficients from traditional GH are biased when applying
the model to non-tariff barriers. In respose to this issue, Facchini et al. (2006) augment
the original framework in order to include the degree of rent capturing, which modifies
the main model’s parameters.
An important work for our framework is the one by Ederington and Minier (2008), who
argue that the traditional applications of Grossman and Helpman (1994) may suffer from
some bias. The authors identify, among the sources of the bias, the fact that a correct
specification of the model should include some extraneous political factors. According to
Ederington and Minier (2008), these factors should be included in the objective function of
the government, and would allow protection to increase in some sectors for reasons other
than lobbying from interest groups. Our framework partially draws from Ederington and
Minier (2008), identifying the consumer externality as an additional variable affecting the
pattern of protection. Similarly to Ederington and Minier (2008), we argue that, even
in politically unorganized industries, protection could increase when government acts to
safeguard consumers.
In addition to the works mentioned above, other extensions of the Grossman and
Helpman (1994) model have been theoretically built and tested. Gawande et al. (2006)
consider, in addition to internal lobbies, also foreign interest groups, which may put pres-
sure on the government to decrease the level of protection. Belloc and Guerrieri (2008)
adapt the GH framework to European trade policies, taking into account lobbying at both
national and European level. Finally, Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) argue that firm size
matters in determining the pattern of protection; they note that in sectors where firms
are larger, lobbies are formed more efficiently, and protection will be easier to obtain.
Regarding consumer externality, our paper is not the first work incorporating such
factor into a political economy model. The model by Aidt (1998) shows that environmen-
tal policy is a product of lobbying activities, and that political competition is a source
of internalization of economic externalities. The author argues that some lobby groups
(e.g. trade unions and consumers associations) modify their demand to take account of
environmental concerns. Similarly, the work by Yu (2005) models the political economy of
environmental policies including consumers’ “disutility of pollution” (negative externality)
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in a GH-like framework. The environmental damage depends on the beliefs of individuals,
and can be influenced by environmental groups through persuasion activity. This indirect
lobbying activity of environmentalists is in contrast with direct lobbying from industrial
groups, which ask for less strict environmental regulations instead. Both forces are taken
into account by the government when it sets the optimal environmental policy. Although
the frameworks by Yu (2005) and Aidt (1998) are mainly thought for emission standards,
our model is partly related to theirs, since we also take account of potential damages to
consumers’ safety or the environment coming from imported products not compliant with
adequate standards. Our paper stresses that this element is considered by the government
when setting the level of protection, representing, together with lobbying activity from
the industry, an important determinant of trade protection.
Consumer externality is also included in the model by Swinnen and Vandemoortele
(2008), who focus on the political economy determinants of health and nutrition stan-
dards. Their framework includes externality in the government objective function as a
cost (negative externality) or benefit (positive externality) coming from consumption of
goods. Moreover, their model allows for the fact that not only producers, but also con-
sumers can be politically organized and lobby the government giving contributions.
Although our paper does not investigate the effect of NTMs on consumers’ economic
well being, but only their political economy determinants, the inclusion of externalities is
in common with some recent works studying the trade and welfare effects of non-tariff mea-
sures (see, for example, Marette and Beghin (2010); Disdier and Marette (2010); Beghin
et al. (2015)). Overall, these works argue that NTMs substantially differ from tariffs,
since they may lead to an increase in consumer welfare by mitigating negative external-
ities. Disdier and Marette (2010) measure the impact of non-tariff measures through a
welfare approach, identifying potential damages coming from imported products as one
of the elements taken into account by the regulator. Their paper shows that stricter
standards, despite being trade restricting, can lead to an increase in both domestic and
international welfare though a reduction in damages. Marette and Beghin (2010) concen-
trate on the trade effect of standards, showing that standards are not always protectionist,
but may be anti-protectionist sometimes. This happens when foreign producers are more
efficient than domestic ones in meeting the standard. Finally, the paper by Beghin et al.
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(2015) measures the ad valorem equivalent of NTMs (AVEs) by taking into account that
non-tariff measures can, in some cases, mitigate negative externalities and enhance foreign
products’ safety and quality, being thus trade facilitating. Beghin et al. (2015), through
their results, show that about 39% of the product lines affected by NTMs exhibit negative
AVEs, having thus trade-facilitating and welfare-enhancing effects.
Finally, our decision to approximate the attention towards consumer externality with
a variable measuring media coverage is in line with some recent literature on the political
economy of mass media. This literature, summarized by Prat and Stro¨mberg (2011) in a
survey, argue that news can influence government policy. The literature review cites some
case studies confirming the above hypothesis. Eisensee and Stro¨mberg (2007) studied the
US government response to natural disasters, showing that relief was higher when the
events were newsworthy. Similarly, Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010) show that congressmen
who are more covered by local press tend to work more for their constituency: they are
more likely to stand witness before congressional hearings and to vote against the party
line. Relying on these findings, we proxy attention towards consumer externalities with
a variable of journal coverage on safety and environmental issues. We hypothesize that
policies set by governments may be more responsive in sectors that are covered by the
news.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework relies on Grossman and Helpman (1994). Their model has the
structure of a common agency framework, that is, a situation where several principals
(the interest groups) induce an agent (the government) to take an action that may be
costly for him. We make a simple extension of GH, including consumer externality in the
government objective function. In our model, externality is intended as potential damage
coming from importing risky products.
In our framework, a small economy is populated by individuals with identical prefer-
ences, whose utility function is represented by:
U = c0 +
n∑
i=1
ui(ci) (2.1)
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where c0 is consumption of the numeraire good, 0, and ci is consumption of goods i =
1, 2, ..., n.
Good 0 is assumed to be produced by labor alone, and freely traded internationally.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), goods i = 1, 2, ..., n are produced using labor and
a sector-specific input, and traded internationally. In this framework, the government is
only allowed to implement policies (tariffs, subsidies, non-tariff measures) that drive a
wedge between domestic and world prices. A tariff or a protectionist NTM leads to higher
domestic price with respect to world price: (pi − p∗i > 0).
The government maximizes the following linear objective function:
G =
∑
i∈L
Ci(p) + aW (p)− b
n∑
i=1
Exti(p) (2.2)
where p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) is a vector of prices of the nonnumeraire good. Ci represents
contributions received from sector i, and L represents the subset of sectors where the
specific-factor owners are organized in a lobby. W represents aggregate welfare, and a is
a constant accounting for the weight that government places on welfare as compared to
contributions. The novelty of our framework, with respect to GH, is the term Exti, which
represents the potential damage coming from the consumption of imported product from
industry i. The parameter b represents the weight that the government puts on externality
as compared to political organization. As in Disdier and Marette (2010), we associate the
externality to foreign products only, and we model it as the risk for consumers to purchase
a defective product from abroad and to be thus affected by damage. Exti is defined as
follows:
Exti(p) = mi(p)ωi ∗ γi (2.3)
where mi is consumption of good i imported from abroad, given by mi = Ndi− yi, where
yi is domestic output of good i, di is the individual demand, and N is the number of
consumers. ωi is the per-unit damage brought by products in sector i (ω ≥ 0), and γi is
the probability of products in sector i to be contaminated (0 ≤ γi ≤ 1).
The aggregate social welfare results from the sum of aggregate income, revenue from
CHAPTER 2. PROTECTION FOR SALE WITH CONSUMER EXTERNALITY 17
trade taxes and consumer’s surplus, as in GH:
W (p) = l +
n∑
i=1
pii +N [r(p) + s(p)] (2.4)
where l is total labor supply. Since GH assume that wage is equal to one, l is also equal to
total labor income. The term pii is the aggregate reward to the specific factor used in pro-
ducing good i. s(p) is consumer surplus derived from consumption of nonnumeraire goods,
and r(p) is the net revenue from trade policies, which is redistributed across consumers
and is expressed as:
r(p) =
n∑
i=1
(pi − p∗)
[
di(pi)− 1
N
yipi
]
(2.5)
Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999), we assume a Nash bargaining game mechanism,
where trade policies are set to maximize the sum of the surpluses of the involved parties
(the government and the lobbies):
Ω =
∑
i∈L
Wi(p) + aW (p)− b
n∑
i=1
Exti(p) (2.6)
where the welfare of lobby i is given by:
Wi = li + pii(pi) + αiN [r(p) + s(p)] (2.7)
where αi accounts for the number of voters who are represented by lobby i.
If we differentiate the joint welfare Ω with respect to the price of good j, and we sum
over all lobbies, we obtain:
∂Ω
∂pj
= (Ij − αL)yj(pj) + (a+ αL)(pj − p∗)m′j(pj) + bExt′j = 0 (2.8)
which, after rearranging, becomes:
−(a+ αL)(pj − p∗)m′j(pj) = (Ij − αL)yj(pj)− bExt′j (2.9)
where Ext′j can be expressed as Extj = m
′
j(pj)ωjγj . Isolating the price wedge on the left
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hand side and rearranging it in terms of ad valorem equivalent:
(pj − p∗)
pj
=
(Ij − αL)
(a+ αL)
yj
(−pjm′j)
− b
(a+ αL)
Ext′j
(−pjm′j)
(2.10)
which can in turn be re-expressed as follows:
(pj − p∗)
pj
=
(Ij − αL)
(a+ αL)
yj
(−pjm′j)
+
bext′
(a+ αL)
yj
(−pjm′j)
(2.11)
where ext′j is the absolute value of Ext
′
j , rescaled by the value of production yj . The
positive sign in front of the last term of equation 2.11 is given by the fact that Ext′j =
m′jωjγj carries a negative sign, driven by m
′
j < 0.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we can express equation 2.11 in terms of elas-
ticity and import penetration, dividing and multiplying each term by m. The resulting
specification will be as follows:
(pj − p∗)
pj
=
(Ij − αL + bext′j)
(a+ αL)
zj
ej
(2.12)
where zj is the inverse import penetration, and ej is the absolute import demand elasticity.
Equation 2.12 can be interpreted as follows. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the
relationship between
zj
ej
and the level of protection is predicted to be positive when sector
j is organized in a lobby, namely when Ij = 1. Indeed, the higher the “stakes from
protection”, the more the government will increase protectionist policies when a sector
is organized. Moreover, protection is expected to increase with the absolute derivative
of the externality, as shown by the positive sign in front of bext′j . Given that the last
term of equation 2.11 always carries a positive sign, and that bext′j depends on ωjγj , with
ωjγj ≥ 0, we can draw the following general prediction. When the government does not
perceive any damage coming from imported products from sector j (ωjγj = 0), then the
relationship between
zj
ej
will be the same as in GH, being positive when sector j is organized
in a lobby, and negative when sector j is unorganized. When, instead, ωjγj > 0, there
will be an additional force, dependent on consumer externality, positively conditioning
the relationship, which will be increasing in ext′j . Therefore, in politically unorganized
sectors, the negative relationship between
zj
ej
and the level of protection will be mitigated
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by a positive sign carried by that relationship when the government perceives a risk for
consumers and the environment. In other words, the level of protection can be raised also
in sectors which are considered unorganized by the traditional Grossman and Helpman
(1994) model if the government cares about environmental, health, safety or other risks
for consumers in that sector.
In the above equations, we have expressed all terms as function of the inverse of import
penetration over the elasticity (
zj
ej
). Another way to express equations 2.10 - 2.12 is the
following:
(pj − p∗)
pj
=
(Ij − αL)
(a+ αL)
yj
(−pjm′j)
− Extj
m′j
(−pjm′j)
(2.13)
where externality is not weighted by the value of internal production. After simplification,
we will obtain:
(pj − p∗)
pj
=
(Ij − αL)
(a+ αL)
yj
(−pjm′j)
+
Extj
(pj)
(2.14)
where the last term of equation 2.14 carries a positive sign. The term
Extj
pj
represents a
ratio between the valuation of externalities from products in sector j and the price pj of
these products. Equation 2.14 confirms the overall predictions of the model: besides the
effect of political pressures from interest groups, there is an additional factor positively
conditioning protection, which is increasing in the perceived damage that consumers have
from imported products (negative externality).
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy has the purpose of testing the extension of the Grossman and
Helpman (1994) model illustrated in the theoretical section of the paper. Despite the
original model having been thought for tariffs, we test it using NTMs, employing a novel
dataset on US non-tariff measures in force in 2014. Although our data include all non-tariff
measures, both technical (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures) and non-technical
(e.g. licensing, quotas and prohibitions), the former represent the major share of NTMs.
As in previous applications of the GH model, the choice of focusing on the United States
is driven by data availability. Indeed, the US is the only country where it is possible to
obtain detailed lobbying expenditures data, due to strict rules on the disclosure of interest
groups’ activity.
Using recent NTMs is interesting in several respects. First, and most importantly for
our purpose, our extension includes the externality component. Being NTMs (technical
regulations in particular) often tied to safety, quality or environmental concerns, the exter-
nality should be more relevant here than when dealing with tariffs and NTBs. Moreover,
testing the GH model on tariffs and NTBs nowadays would not be as relevant as it was in
the early applications of the model. Indeed, as outlined in the introduction, NTMs have
been progressively replacing tariffs in many countries over the last decades. In addition
to this, testing the GH model on NTMs is interesting per se, irrespectively of our exten-
sion including externalities. Indeed, the uncertain protectionist effect of technical NTMs
makes it particularly interesting to study their political economy determinants. Given the
double nature of NTMs, which might be trade protectionist in some cases, and trade fa-
cilitating and welfare enhancing in other cases, it is uncertain whether the GH predictions
previously tested on NTBs and tariff will be confirmed or not.
Our theoretical model predicts that protection should depend on the level of externali-
ties. Indeed, the higher the perceived risk for consumers, the higher the level of protection
set by the government. However, finding a good proxy for externality is not straightfor-
ward, since the risk for consumers’ depends, in our framework, on policy makers’ concern
about health and the environment, which is hard to measure. Given this problem, we
decide to approximate externality with a variable coming from US newspapers, which is
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built by counting, for each manufacturing sectors, how often products from that indus-
try recur in the news associated with topics such as consumer safety and environmental
protection.
For our empirical analysis, we bring equation 2.12 to a testable form. This implies
approximating ext, which is not directly measurable, with a dummy variable. Looking
at the different components of 2.12, we can state that, if no perceived risk for consumers
exists, then the last term in parentheses, bext′, will disappear. By contrast, if ext > 0 in a
certain sector, then the same term will have a positive sign, and the negative relationship
between
z
e
and the level of protection will be mitigated. Based on these considerations,
we obtain the following testable equation:
NTMi = β1(
zi
ei
) + β2(Ii ∗ zi
ei
) + β3(Ei ∗ zi
ei
) + i (2.15)
where the dependent variable, NTMi, accounts for the average number of non-tariff mea-
sures affecting products in sector i. As in GH, β2 is expected to be positive: when a sector
is politically organized (Ii = 1), the level of protection is expected to display a positive
relationship with
zi
ei
. With a similar logic, β3 is expected to carry a positive sign. The
term Ei is a dummy variable accounting for whether products imported from abroad and
produced by sector i are perceived as bearers of a potential damage to consumers and
derives from our proxy for externality. β1 is, instead, predicted to be negative: if industry
i is not politically organized and its products are not perceived as relevant in terms of
safety, quality or environmental characteristics, then the the level of protection is on aver-
age lower, and decreasing with an increase in
zi
ei
. Finally, i is the error term, accounting
for unobserved industry-level characteristics affecting industry i.
2.5 Econometric Methodology
We estimate equation 2.15 using the econometric methodology proposed by Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000) and later adopted in other applications of extended versions of
the GH framework (e.g. Gawande et al. (2006), Bombardini (2008)). The econometric
strategy consists of a two-stage least squares procedure, which accounts for the potential
endogeneity of import penetration, political organization and our externality measure.
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The fact that lobbying and the level of protection could be simultaneously determined has
been already pointed out by previous works (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000)). Stronger lobbying pressures in a sector could be a reaction to
a certain level of protection, which generates a reverse causality issue. Import penetration
could be also endogenously determined with respect to NTMs, as first recognized by Trefler
(1993). Indeed, trade policies may lead to a change in import flows, which would translate
into a change in the ratio of internal consumption over imported goods. Finally, our
additional variable accounting for the potential risk (negative externality) for consumers
could suffer from endogeneity as well. Since our variable derives from the media, one
can argue that the attention of journals towards specific products or classes of products
could increase as a response to stricter (or looser) policies set by the government on those
products.
To solve the concerns outlined above, our econometric strategy is made of four different
equations, where each dependent variable is treated as endogenous:
NTMi = β0 + β1
zi
ei
+ β2
zi
ei
Ii + β3
zi
ei
Ei + 1 (2.16)
1
zi
= η0 + η1NTMi +XPi + 2 (2.17)
ln
(Lobbyingi
V ai
)
= γ0 + γ1ln(NTMi) + γ2ln
( 1
zi
)
+ γ3ln(ei) + xLi + 3 (2.18)
ln
( Ei
V ai
)
= θ0 + θ2ln(NTMi) + θ3ln
( 1
zi
)
+ xIi + 4 (2.19)
where equation 2.16 is aimed at testing the main predictions of the model, and derives from
equation 2.15. NTMi is a measure taking account of the number of non-tariff measures in
sector i; zi is the inverse import penetration variable, computed as the value of output over
imports, and ei is the import demand elasticity. Finally Ii is our political organization
variable, and Ei is our proxy for externality, being both expressed as indicators assuming
the value of 0 or 1.
Equation 2.17 is the import penetration equation and includes NTMi as dependent
variable and a vector of exogenous instruments, XPi. To instrument import penetration,
we use some of the variables suggested by Trefler (1993), selecting them according to
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their correlation with zi. The selected instruments are related to the structure of the
labor market, and include the percentage of white collar workers, unskilled workers and
semiskilled workers. Labor maket structure, as argued by Trefler (1993) and by other
works applying the GH model (e.g. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Goldberg and
Maggi (1999)), is a component of a sector’s comparative advantage, which determines in
turn import penetration.
Equation 2.18 is the lobbying equation, where the logarithm of lobbying expenditures
over value added (LobbyingiV ai ) is regressed on the logarithm of import penetration, NTM and
elasticity, as well as instrumented with an exogenous variable, xLi. We use, as exogenous
instrument for lobbying expenditures on trade issues, those lobbying expenditures that
are not related to trade. This is done by manually selecting those lobbying issues that are
far away from trade. Moreover, we exclude those issues that are related to regulations,
like, for example, environment and food safety, in order to rule out potential sources of
correlation with NTMs. For a list of the issues selected to build the instrument, see Table
2.9, reported in the Appendix of the paper.
Finally, in equation 2.19 the externality indicator variable taken from LexisNexis
and weighted by value added, EiV ai , is regressed on the other model’s variables, NTM and
import penetration, and on its exogenous instrument xIi . To instrument the number of
articles on US journals related to consumers’ safety and environment, we use the number of
articles from non US journals, excluding safety and environment as issues. With a similar
logic as the one applied to lobbying, it is very unlikely that generic articles not related to
consumers’ health and environment are correlated with the level of trade policies.
In our system of equations, variables are regressed one to each other in a nonlinear fash-
ion. Indeed, political organization and externality are measured as dummy variables and
interacted with the inverse ratio of import penetration to elasticity in the NTM equation,
but expressed as continuous variables in the import penetration and externality equation.
The lobbying and the externality equations are in log, while the other two equations are in
level. Moreover, import penetration enters equation 2.16 as zi, and equations 2.18-2.19 as
1
zi
. Finally, zi and ei enter equation 2.16 interacted with each other and with the dummy
variables, and the other equations alone. Because of these nonlinearities, the estimation
by normal two-stage or three stage least square would return biased structural coefficients.
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For this reason, as in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), we implement the two-stage
least squares estimator proposed by Kelejian (1971). This method consists of regressing
the nonlinear expressions on linear, squared and first-order cross products of the exogenous
variables. Kelejian (1971) shows that, in this way, a traditional two-stage least squares
can be used and has the desirable properties of consistency and asymptotic efficiency.
In addition to the baseline specification shown in equations 2.16-2.19, we also imple-
ment an extended version of our model, where additional determinants of protection are
included in the NTM equation.
2.6 Data Sources
2.6.1 Non-Tariff Measures
As anticipated in the above paragraphs, the GH framework was originally created for
tariffs. The protection measure conceived by Grossman and Helpman (1994), indeed,
creates a wedge between domestic price and world price. However, the majority of the
papers applying the GH model to real data (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Gawande et al., 2006) have used non-tariff barriers (NTBs) instead
of tariffs. This choice has been driven mainly by the fact that tariffs were generally set
cooperatively, being thus not ideal for testing a model based on a non-cooperative game
such as the GH framework. The extension of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model
presented here is applied on NTMs instead. These measures, by comparison with NTBs
used in previous applications of GH, do not have a declared protectionist intent, and
include technical measures (SPS and TBT). Therefore, they are appropriate to test the
GH extension that includes consumer externality. Moreover, testing the model on NTMs
is more reasonable nowadays than 20 or 30 years ago, given the consistent decrease in
tariffs in all manufacturing sectors.
In order to measure NTM coverage across industries, we exploit a new database taken
from UNCTAD, relative to 20142. These data comprehend the 2014 stock of non-tariff
measures imposed by the United States to all the world partners, each measure being
associated with a sector covered in the Harmonized System (HS) classification at 6-digit
2We warmly thank Marco Fugazza and Alessandro Antimiani for providing us this new data source.
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Figure 2.1: Non-tariff measure classification by chapter, official international classification
by UNCTAD. Source: UNCTAD (2012)
level of disaggregation (HS-6). As shown in Figure 2.1, NTMs are classified into technical
and non-technical. Given the strong prevalence of technical measures over non-technical
NTMs in the dataset, our analysis is focused on the former. Indeed, almost the totality of
NTMs is represented by categories SPS (category A, 30% of the total) and TBT (category
B, 65% of the total).
In order to merge our NTM data with lobbying data and sectors’ characteristics, it is
necessary to convert non-tariff measures at NAICS-6-digit level. Since the concordance
between HS and NAICS exists at the HS-10 level of disaggregation (see Pierce and Schott,
2012), we expand the NTM dataset to such a level. To do this, we assume that, when
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an HS-6 sector is covered by one NTM, then all the underliying HS-10 sub-sectors are
affected3.
In order to quantify NTM at sectoral (e.g. NAICS 6-digit) level, previous GH applica-
tions have used NTM coverage ratio, which measures the percentage of products covered
by at least one NTM. Coverage ratio is based on a dummy variable assuming the value
of 1 if a product is covered by at least one measure, and 0 otherwise. However, the NTM
structure has considerably changed from 1983 to 2014, and the majority of sectors turns
out to be covered by at least one non-tariff measure. We would thus have an absence
of variation in NTMs across sectors. In order to obtain a measure taking account of the
number of NTMs by NAICS sector, we compute a prevalence score using the approach
proposed by Gourdon et al. (2014):
NTMi =
∑
j∈iNj ∗ IMPj
IMPi
(2.20)
where i is the specific NAICS 6-digit sector whose prevalence score we want to compute,
and the subsectors j are, in our case, the HS-10 sectors associated with the NAICS industry
i. Nj is the number of NTMs covering HS-10 product j, and IMP is the value of general
imports from all the partners in the world to the United States. Being the majority of
products subject to more than one regulatory measure, the score NTMi gives the average
number of NTMs affecting imports in sector i. Employing this measure, we assume that,
the higher the number of NTMs applied to a product, the more regulated the commerce
of that product is.
Despite the fact that the prevalence ratio is a more precise indicator than the coverage
ratio is, we are aware that the number of NTMs might not be exactly proportional to
their protectionist effect. Given our theoretical framework, which intends trade policies
as measures that drive a wedge between domestic and world price, the ideal dependent
variable would be ad valorem equivalent of NTMs. Such a variable would quantify the price
effect of NTMs, allowing us to distinguish the measures that have a protectionist effect
3The original database is restricted to non-tariff measures imposed on all the World trade partners. To
associate HS-10 sectors to NAICS 6-digit industries, we exploited the conversion produced by Pierce and
Schott (2012). This classification is partially incomplete, since the last available year is 2009 and some
HS10 have been removed and added since then. We thus classify by hand the remaining sectors, basing
on their official description.
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from the ones that don’t. However, ad valorem equivalents are not easy to measure, and
have not been estimated for recent years. Therefore, we limit our analysis to the prevalence
ratio, leaving the estimation of ad valorem equivalents to possible future developments of
this research.
2.6.2 Political Organization
The data used to define the political organization indicator represent one of the elements
of novelty of our analysis. The authors who tested the GH model on 1983 data (e.g.
Goldberg and Maggi (1999); Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000); Bombardini (2008))
defined political organization of sectors using data on contributions from Political Action
Committees (PACs). Contributions, however, are not attributable to any specific issue,
making it difficult to disentangle trade-related lobbying. For our analysis, we use instead
industry-level data on lobbying expenditures. This data is available since 1998 and con-
sist of money spent by firms and associations to hire lobbyists, who carry out lobbying
activities directed at members of the United States Congress. This type of activity has
been often defined as “informational lobbying”, since interest groups mainly act through
providing information to members of the government. Despite the original Grossman and
Helpman (1994) model having been conceived for political contributions, using informa-
tional lobbying data to define the degree of political organization of sectors has some
advantages with respect to the use of PACs. First, differently from PACS data, lobbying
data give the opportunity to select the specific issues on which the lobbying activities are
carried out. We can thus identify those firms that lobby on trade issues, having a more
precise measure than the one obtained from PACs. Moreover, expenditures on lobbying
activities are much higher than money spent on lobbying contributions. Figure 2.2 shows
the total amount of lobbying expenditures, trade-related lobbying expenditures and con-
tributions from PACs for the period considered by our analysis. From the graph, we can
notice that firms and organizations allocate to lobbying spending more than 3 billion dol-
lars a year, a much higher amount than political contributions from PACs. Trade-related
lobbying expenditures represent around one third of the total, meaning that trade is a
relevant issue for interest groups. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that in-
formational lobbying influence the government in a similar way as contributions. First,
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there is evidence that the two activities (lobbying and campaign contributions) are stricly
related. Grossman and Helpman (2001) argue that contributions often have the role of
buying access to politicians or strenghtening the credibility of interest groups, which then
influence decision makers through the use of information. Moreover, like contributions,
informational lobbying activities represent a cost from the interest groups’ perspective,
since they involve hiring lobbyists. At the same time, information is an important re-
source for policy makers, since it helps them learning about technical details, shaping
policies and maintaining relationships with industry and with relevant trade associations
and organizations.
Data on lobbying come from the Center for Responsive Politics and have been down-
loaded from the www.opensecrets.org webpage, which the center maintains. This public
database allows one to obtain annual registration records, where each “registrant” (the
company carrying out lobbying activities) is linked to a “client” (the firm, association or
organization hiring the lobbyists). We cover the period from 2008 to 2014. Differently
from PACs contributions, lobbying data are available every year, since they are not strictly
linked to congressional cycles. Being as our specific interest is on trade policy, we select
only those records listing “TRADE” or “TARIFF” among the issues of interest. This
allows disentangling trade-related lobbying activities. Previous works using PACs had,
instead, assumed proportionality between total PACs and trade-related PACs (e.g. Gold-
berg and Maggi (1999)), or implemented econometric procedures to link general PACs to
trade policies (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)).
In order to get sectoral lobbying expenditures, we manually classified every client into
a 6-digit NAICS sector. When it was not possible to match a client to a 6-digits sector, we
linked it to lower level of disaggregation (5- 4- or 3-digits). To obtain a measure of lobbying
intensity in each sector, we divide lobbying expenditures by the number of firms and we
weight them by the industry’s value added (V ai). Since our model, as shown in equation
2.15, requires a dummy variable to distinguish between organized and unorganized sectors
(I), we use thresholds of LobbyingV a to define the cutoff. Since the threshold is based on an
arbitrary decision, we use different values of LobbyingV a to define our indicator variable I,
with the purpose of testing for the sensitivity of our results when the cutoff value to define
political organization changes.
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Figure 2.2: Source: Authors’ own calculations using data from Opensecrets
2.6.3 Consumer Externality
In the extension of GH presented by this work, consumer externality plays a major role
in determining the pattern of protection across sectors. In our framework, the number of
NTMs covering a specific sector should depend on government’s perception of consumer
safety or environment-related risk coming from consumption of imported goods. Being
as externality is very hard to measure, in our empirical analysis we approximate it with
a categorical variable accounting for consumers’ sensitivity to specific characteristics of
products. We build this variable using US journal articles related to safety or environ-
mental issues. The idea of using media to approximate the attention of politicians towards
consumers’ well being and the environment is in line with a strand of literature studying
the political economy of media and, in particular, the policy effects of media coverage (see
Prat and Stro¨mberg (2011) for a survey). This literature studies the co-movement over
time in coverage of an issue in the media, the importance attached by the public to that
issue, and policy responses. Indeed, media are sometimes able to create a policy bias,
favoring policy responses on issues that get higher press coverage.
To define our externality indicator variable, we first build an index of journal coverage
by sector, making use of the online platform Lexis Nexis Academic. Lexis Nexis Academic
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contains full-text news from major international and national sources, reported since 19804.
The use of Lexis Nexis presents, for our purpose, several important advantages. First, the
platform itself classifies the articles from the news by industry or product. Secondly, the
industry classification of Lexis Nexis is based on the NAICS classification, allowing us to
match the media variable with the other data used in our analysis. Third, the articles
are also classified by topic. Among the listed topics, Lexis Nexis includes “Safety” and
“Environment”, which we have chosen to analyse.
To define our E dummy variable, we implemented the following strategy. All the
manufacturing industries and products listed by Lexis Nexis were matched to a NAICS
4-digit category5. Since the classification operated by Lexis Nexis is, in some cases, less
refined than the NAICS, we decided to build the externality variable at 4-digit level.
Moreover, for those industries or products not precisely corresponding to a NAICS sector,
we helped ourselves with the official website http://siccode.com/, which provides a
detailed description of all goods and services included in each NAICS code. Then, for
each sector, we ran our search on the online platform, obtaining a count of the number of
articles associated with each industry and product category. This count was done multiple
times, filtering Lexis Nexis according to different criteria: first, we picked articles from
all US newspapers associated with the topics labeled as “Safety” an “Product Safety”;
second, we specifically selected the reviews Consumer Report and Consumer Report -
Health; third, we selected as topics “Environment” and “Environmental Protection”.
In our analysis, the number of safety or environment-related articles represents a proxy
of the sensitiveness of consumers to a specific product category. We approximate consumer
externality with the dummy variable (E ), which is equal to 1 when the articles number
exceeds a certain threshold. With a similar logic as the one used to define the organization
I, we first take the median and then change thresholds in order to test for the robustness
of our results.
4As for the United States, all the major US journals are included, except for the Wall Street Journal.
5To obtain the best correspondence between industry and product codes in Lexis Nexis and the NAICS
classification, we manually selected all codes that can be linked to the manufacturing industry. Specifically,
we selected the whole “Manufacturing” category, as well as the other following categories: “Defense and
Aerospace”, “Electronics”, “Consumer Products”, “Chemicals”, “Automotive”, “Fashion and Apparel”,
“Food and Beverage”, “Paper and Packaging”, “Pharmaceuticals”, “Computer and Information Technol-
ogy”.
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2.6.4 Elasticities and Other Variables
Import demand elasticities are taken from Kee et al. (2008), who estimated them at HS-
6 digit level of disaggregation. We matched these estimates with the HS-10 products
included in each HS-6. Then, the mean of elasticities by NAICS-6 digit sector was com-
puted. Since elasticity is an estimated variable, its reliability may be limited. For this
reason, following Gawande and Bandyopahdyay (2000), we decided to exclude the elas-
ticity values with the highest standard errors (s.e.>9), as well as the ones with a positive
sign. This leads us to exclude part of the observations, ending up with a smaller sample
size with respect to the original database (277 NAICS 6-digit sectors instead of 316).
The other variables included in our empirical specification are the exogenous instru-
ments for the Import Penetration equation, as well as the control variables included in the
main equation when testing the extended version of the GH model. These variables were
obtained from different sources.
The value of imports comes from the United States Census Bureau (UCB) and was
downloaded at both NAICS 6-digit and HS-10 level. This variable is used to compute
import penetration, as well as to weight the number of NTMs in our prevalence ratio
index (see equation 2.20).
All the stuctural characteristics of sectors (value added, employment, capital expen-
ditures, etc.) are taken from the Annual Survey of Manufacture (ASM), which can be
found on UCB. The Concentration Index is taken from UCB and represents the percent-
age of value added held by the 4 largest firms. The latest available data are the ones
from 2007. When these variables were not available for all NAICS-6 digits sectors, we
computed the mean over the NAICS-4 for the missing observations. The number of union
members by sector is taken from Unionstats, which draws these data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS). The occupation categories are taken from the Bureau of Labour
Statistics (BLS). Following Trefler (1993), we group BLS categories into 5 broader groups
of employees: engineers and scientists, white collars, skilled workers, semiskilled workers,
and unskilled workers.
Finally, the percentage of final goods over total output is taken from input-ouput
account data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We compute this variable from
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the Use table, which shows how each industry’s output is shared between final consumption
and intermediate use. The BEA sectors are matched to the NAICS classification through
specific correspondence tables.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Main Results
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for our main variables of interest. NTM prevalence
ratio has a sample mean of 20.18, meaning that NAICS sectors used in our analysis are
covered, on average, by around 20 non-tariff measures. Of primary interest are also the
import penetration and its inverse (zi), which show sample mean of 0.82% and 13.8%,
respectively, and import demand elasticity, with an average absolute value of 2.29. The
variable entering our main specification is the inverse ratio of import penetration over the
absolute elasticity,
zi
ei
, which has a sample mean of 37.17. We also show summary statistics
for lobbying expenditures at the beginning and at the end of our considered period, and for
lobbying weighted by sectoral value added, that we use to create our political organization
indicator. Moreover, table 2.1 displays summary statistics for our baseline variable from
Lexis Nexis counting the articles related to safety from 2004 to 2014, that are on average
910. Finally, summary statistics for the control variables used in the extended version of
the model are also reported. We first test the baseline Grossman and Helpman (1994)
model, without taking account of consumer externality. Table 2.2 shows results coming
from the application of GH, using NTM prevalence ratio as dependent variable. As in
Gawande et al. (2006), the indicator variable I is equal to one when lobbying expenditures
weighted by sectoral value added are above a certain threshold in all considered years
(2008-2014). We run the same regression using four different thresholds, of which the
lowest corresponds to the 10th percentile and the highest to the 40th percentile.
Our results are consistent with the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework, which
predicts that the relationship between trade protection and import penetration (or bet-
ter, its inverse) depends critically on whether an industry is politically organized or not.
Indeed, the estimated coefficients β1 and β2 have positive and negative signs, respectively,
with β2 > β1. The cofficient β1 is statistically significant at the 0.01 level only for the
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NTM Prevalence Ratio 20.18 18.93 4 224.19
Import Penetration 0.82 2.12 0.00 22.60
Elasticity 2.29 2.50 0.03 30.38
zi 13.80 55.26 0.04 767.05
zi
ei
37.17 130.42 0.09 1,540.06
Mn $ LOBFIRM (2008) 2.94 6.36 0 31.40
Mn $ LOBFIRM (2014) 1.57 2.30 0 17.50
LOBFIRM/Va (2008) 0.90 3.08 0 34.95
LOBFIRM/Va (2014) 0.38 0.52 0 3.36
Safety Related Articles 910.63 2,661.26 0 22,000
Concentration Index 43.62 20.66 0 97.37
% Union Members 9.65 6.17 0 30.40
Capital-Labor Ratio 0.26 0.30 0.03 2.77
Scale 31.33 104.56 0.92 1,512.24
lowest threshold (10th percentile). By contrast, β2 is positive and significant for all thresh-
olds, showing that the main prediction coming from the Grossman and Helpman (1994)
model and found by previous works is still valid today, using NTMs as dependent variable
and defining political organization based on recent trade-related lobbying data. Indeed,
our results tell us that, ceteris paribus, NTMs tend to be numerically higher in politically
organized sectors than in unorganized ones.
Table 2.3 shows results obtained by testing equation 2.15, where the externality com-
plonent is added to the GH equation. The variable
zi
ei
is interacted not only with the
political organization dummy variable, but also with the externality indicator. For our
baseline analysis, we use the 50th percentile of our externality variable, obtained as the
number of safety-related articles from Lexis Nexis weighted by value added, to discrimi-
nate between sectors where E = 0 and those where E = 1. Since, similarly to political
organization, we use an arbitrary threshold to identify those sectors where the govern-
ment is actually concerned about consumer safety, we also test the model with higher
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Table 2.2: Baseline GH model with different thresholds for political organization
Dependent Variable:
NTMi 10th Percentile 20th Percentile 30th Percentile 40th Percentile
zi
ei
-0.307** -0.054 -0.057 -0.057
(-2.34) (-1.30) (-1.37) (-1.44)
zi
ei
∗ Ii 0.354*** 0.133** 0.139** 0.150***
(2.64) (2.48) (2.55) (2.79)
Constant 20.79*** 18.76*** 18.84*** 19.16***
(11.59) (12.56) (12.52) (12.47)
N 277 277 277 277
% I=1 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.46
Model F 4.38** 4.17** 4.31** 4.92***
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and ei is
absolute import elasticity. Percentile values of lobbying expenditures (from 10th to 40th) are
used to define the cutoff above which I is equal to 1.
and lower thresholds as a robustness check. Our results are in line with the predictions
coming out of our theoretical framework. The relationship between import penetration
and protection through non-tariff measures depends not only on whether the industry is
politically organized, but also on whether the government is concerned about consumers’
safety. The coefficient β1 is negative, showing that, when there is neither political activity
from industry nor government’s concern about potential externalities, NTM prevalence
ratio depends negatively on the inverse of import penetration. By contrast, both β2 and
β3 carry a positive sign, showing that the above relationship is mitigated when either
lobbying pressure from industry is high or consumers are subject to health or safety risks
coming from imported products. Note that, even if the negative relationship between the
inverse ratio of import penetration to elasticity is softened by the existence of both polit-
ical organization and attention towards consumer safety, the negative sign on
zi
ei
is never
reversed. Indeed, if we sum β1 and β2, the resulting effect of
zi
ei
on NTMs is still negative
for politically organized sectors, even if much less strong than for unorganized ones. The
same happens when summing β1 and β3, which turn out to be very close in magnitude.
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Table 2.3: Parsimonious Specification: GH Model Including Externalities
Dependent Variable:
NTMi 10th Percentile 20th Percentile 30th Percentile 40th Percentile
zi
ei
-0.249* -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.156***
(-1.83) (-2.84) (-2.84) (-2.59)
zi
ei
∗ Ii 0.219 0.135** 0.138** 0.121**
(1.15) (2.24) (2.26) (2.07)
zi
ei
∗ Ei 0.0944 0.190*** 0.185*** 0.157**
(0.92) (2.72) (2.65) (2.24)
Constant 20.87*** 20.16*** 20.20*** 20.30***
(12.37) (11.48) (11.55) (11.74)
N 277 277 277 277
% I=1 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.46
% E=1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Model F 3.67** 4.43*** 4.48*** 4.27***
AIC 15.85 16.01 16.00 15.98
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and ei is
absolute import elasticity. Percentile values of lobbying expenditures (from 10th to 40th) are
used to define the cutoff above which I is equal to 1. The cutoff to set E equal to 1 corresponds
to the 50th percentile value of our media variable.
In general, we can draw from our results that government tends to set a higher number of
NTMs in industries that are more affected by foreign imports. This result is in line with
findings from other papers on the political economy of trade protection (see, for example
Maggi and Rodrıguez-Clare (2000), Lee and Swagel (1997) and Herghelegiu (2016)).
More importantly for our framework, we can state that, all else held constant, NTMs
are higher both in industries represented by organized lobbies and in sectors where the
attention towards consumers’ safety is high. The thresholds for I are the same as in
Table 2.2. As shown at the bottom of the table, the higher the threshold, the lower the
percentage of NAICS industries considered as politically organized. All three coefficients
of interest are statistically significant for all thresholds, with the exception of the lowest
one.
Table 2.4 adds some control variables to our baseline specification with externality.
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Table 2.4: Extended Specification: GH Model Including Externalities
Dependent Variable:
NTMi 10th Percentile 20th Percentile 30th Percentile 40th Percentile
zi
ei
-0.252* -0.207*** -0.203*** -0.166***
(-1.86) (-2.95) (-2.96) (-2.74)
zi
ei
∗ Ii 0.209 0.140** 0.141** 0.124**
(1.11) (2.25) (2.27) (2.11)
zi
ei
∗ Ei 0.103 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.162**
(1.03) (2.80) (2.73) (2.31)
Concentration Index -0.111 -0.134* -0.132* -0.128*
(-1.60) (-1.76) (-1.75) (-1.72)
% Union Members 0.156 0.090 0.078 0.109
(0.69) (0.36) (0.31) (0.44)
Capital
Labour
2.523 2.433 3.065 3.028
(0.42) (0.37) (0.47) (0.47)
Scale 0.026 0.030 0.029 0.030*
(1.56) (1.64) (1.58) (1.66)
Constant 22.92*** 23.75*** 23.69*** 23.30***
(6.20) (5.95) (5.97) (5.99)
N 277 277 277 277
% I=1 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.46
% E=1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Model F*** 2.64** 2.79*** 2.82*** 2.78***
AIC 15.56 15.73 15.72 15.70
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and ei is
absolute import elasticity. Percentile values of lobbying expenditures (from 10th to 40th) are
used to define the cutoff above which I is equal to 1. The cutoff to set E equal to 1 corresponds
to the 50th percentile value of our media variable.
Following previous literature (e.g. Trefler (1993), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000),
Gawande et al. (2006)), we include some explanatory variables which could influence the
level of protection through NTMs: the concentration index of sectors; the percentage of
workers that is part of a union; capital-labor ratio; the average firm size (scale). The coef-
ficients on these variables turn out to be almost always statistically insignificant, with the
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exception of the concentration index. More importantly, our coefficients of interest β1, β2
and β3 are only affected by very small changes when the additional regressors are included.
Akaike information criterion (AIC) is reported to compare the parsimonious specification
with the extended specification. According to such criterion, which is appropriate for
nested models, the “best” model is the one with minimum AIC. By comparing Table 2.3
with Table 2.4, we can conclude that the extended specification performs somewhat better
than the parsimonious one, being as the AIC value is slightly lower in the former than in
the latter.6 In our words, we can state that the fit of our baseline model is not damaged
by including additional regressors.
With reference to the above results, Table 2.5, shown in the Appendix of the paper,
reports first stage estimation outcomes of the import penetration, political organization
and externality equations. All three potentially endogenous variables are regressed on
their exogenous instruments, as well as on the other model’s variables, as shown in equa-
tions 2.18-2.19. Results from all three equations show that all selected instruments are
strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. Moreover, the positive and statistically
significant coefficient on NTMs in both the lobbying equation and the externality equation
is an indication of the existence of an endogenous relationship, showing also the direction
of the bias, which turns out to be positive in both cases.
Our estimates allow us to draw some considerations about the magnitude of the effect of
both political organization and presence of consumer externality on NTM prevalence ratio.
Consider, for example, results from Column 2 of Table 2.4. Looking at our main coefficients
of interest, we can infer that an increase of 1 in the inverse of import penetration over
elasticity leads to a decrease of 0.20 in NTM prevalence ratio for politically unorganized
sectors. The same increase in the inverse ratio of import penetration to import elasticity
leads to a 0.06 decrease in NTMs when a sector is politically organized (given by β1 +β2),
and to a 0.01 decrease in NTMs when the government cares about consumer externality.
Looking at our summary statistics, which show a mean value of 37 for our inverse ratio of
6The Akaike information criterion is computed as
−2(lnL− k)
N
, where lnL is the log of the maximum
likelihood, k are the degrees of freedom, and N is the sample size. The other possible test to compare
models is the Shwartz criterion (SIC) (see Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)). In our model comparison,
the Shwartz criterion gives the same results as the Akaike. Values of the test are not reported, but are
available upon request.
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import penetration to elasticity, we can conclude that the presence of an organized sector
leads, on average, to a 5.18 (37*0.14) increase in NTM prevalence ratio. With the same
logic, we can say that, in sectors where some concern about consumer externality exists,
NTM prevalence ratio increases by 7.29 on average with respect to the sectors with no such
concern. Given these numbers, we can conclude that our estimates find an economically
significant effect of both political organization and attention towards consumer safety on
the NTM prevalence ratio. This sheds some light on the dual nature of NTMs: on one
side, they are aimed at protecting the domestic manufacturing industry; on the other side,
they also have the objective of protecting consumers from the risk of negative externalities
coming from imported products.
Unlike previous applications of the GH framework, we do not aim here at inferring the
weight attributed by the government to social welfare, lobbies and consumer’s externality.
Indeed, the original Grossman and Helpman (1994) model is microfounded, allowing the
retrieval of precise values of αL (the fraction of people organized into a lobby) and a (the
weight that government places on social welfare as compared to lobbying). In our model,
externality is included as an additional factor in government’s function, multiplied by the
weight b, which is the relative importance of externality for the government with respect to
political contributions (see equation 2.12). Given the structure of our model, inferring the
exact value of b would only be possible if we were able to compute the precise value of the
externality (and its derivative) at the sectoral level. However, externality is unmeasurable,
and our empirical strategy consists in an approximation of the model, where a dummy
variable indicates whether consumers perceive any health and environmental risk or not in
a certain sector. Therefore, the weights a and b cannot be precisely inferred. The purpose
of our empirical test is instead to investigate whether government’s concern about health
and potential risks for consumers, besides lobbying pressure from industries, is a relevant
motivation for increasing the number of non-tariff measures.
2.7.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present some robustness checks that we performed to test for the
sensitivity of our results.
Table 2.6 shows our first test, which consists in using alternative definitions of the
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externality indicator variable E. In the first two columns of the table, the dummy variable
is still based on the number of articles taken from Lexis Nexis, selecting articles from all
US journals associated with the topic labeled as “Environment” rather than “Safety”.
Since NTMs are often associated, besides health and safety of consumers, with protection
from environmental risks, it is interesting to test whether environmental concerns actually
push the government to increase the number of non-tariff measures. The third and fourth
column of Table 2.6, instead, show results with the externality dummy variable built using
only the reviews Consumer Reports and Consumer Reports Health. These two reviews are
published by Consumers Union, a non-profit organization dedicated to product testing
and consumer-oriented research. By selecting these media sources, we are only considering
articles related to consumer safety and product quality. Results in Table 2.6 confirm our
main findings7. For all definitions of E, the ratio
zi
ei
shows a positive relationship with
the NTM prevalence ratio in sectors where products are associated with externalities for
consumers. At the same time, the coefficient on organized sectors remains positive and
significant.
Table 2.7 presents results obtained defining the variable E with different thresholds
with respect to the one used in our main specification. While results shown in subsection
2.7.1 use the 50th percentile of our externality variable taken from Lexis Nexis to identify
industries whose products are associated with consumers’ safety and quality issues, we use
here the 40th and 60th percentiles, to test whether our results are sensitive to decreasing
and increasing the threshold. Results prove to be robust to this sensitivity test, since the
coefficient β3 is similar in sign, significance and magnitude to its estimate in Table 2.4.
Finally, Table 2.8 displays results from our extended model obtained by excluding
those sectors whose output is manly employed as intermediate goods as opposed to final
consumption. Indeed, being as externality is often related to a damage (if negative) or
a benefit (if positive) for consumers, it is reasonable to think that intermediate products
are unlikely to raise concerns related to product safety. Therefore, it is interesting to test
whether our results change when we restrict our analysis to those sectors where the ratio
between final and intermediate products is sufficiently high. As explained in the data
7For this robustness check, as well as for the other sensitivity analyses shown in this subsection, we
only show two of the four used thresholds for the political organization variable. However, results from
the other thresholds also confirm previous findings and are available upon request.
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section, we build the ratio of final goods over total output using the BEA Use tables and
then matching the BEA classification with the NAICS one. Then, we test results from
our extended model by excluding those sectors where the percentage of output used for
final consumption is lower than the 10th and 20th percentile value, respectively. Results
confirm the predictions of our model. After restricting the sample, the coefficient β2,
relative to politically organized sectors, is still positive and significant at the 0.5 or 0.1
level. More interestingly, the coefficient β3 on sectors raising concerns about consumers’
externalities is substantially larger here than in our baseline results, and further increases
when we switch from the 10th to the 20th percentile as threshold to restrict our sample.
This indicates that comparing sectors where consumer externality is relevant with sectors
where it is not is even more important when a sufficient fraction of products are employed
in final consumption.
2.8 Summary and Conclusions
With the progressive increase of non-tariff measures as trade policy instrument, studying
the political economy determinants of these measures has become of primary relevance. In
particular, when considering technical measures such as standards and labelling require-
ments, it is important to take into account that they reflect public policy goals. Indeed,
they are set with the intention of ensuring consumers’ health and safety and protectiong
the environment. However, they may be also be applied in a way that restricts trade,
resulting sometimes in a protectionist effect.
Our paper extends the “Protection for Sale” model by Grossman and Helpman (1994)
to the inclusion of consumer externality. In our framework, the government sets trade
policies taking account of political contributions, public welfare, and the concern about
the potential damage coming from imported products and affecting consumers (negative
externality). The model predicts that protection should increase, on average, both when
a sector is politically organized, and when consumers and the environment are exposed to
risk of damages.
We test the predictions of our framework using 2014 data on non-tariff measures im-
posed by the United States on all the World partners. Given the consumer safeguard
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purpose of NTMs, these measures represent the ideal trade policy instrument to test our
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model with consumer externality. Our application rep-
resents a novelty with respect to previous empirical literature (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi
(1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)) in several respects. First, we use recent
data on non-tariff measures instead of non-tariff barriers to trade. Second, we measure
political organization using data on trade-related lobbying expenditures instead of generic
contributions from Political Action Committees. Finally, we augment our empirical speci-
fication with a measure of consumer externality, using US journals to build a proxy for the
attention towards safety and health issues across products from manufacturing sectors.
Our results confirm predictions from our theoretical framework. In line with the Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) model, we find a negative relationship between the inverse ratio
of import penetration to absolute elasticity and the average number of NTMs across in-
dustries. However, this relationship is mitigated when an industry is politically organized,
a well as when consumers and the environment are exposed to risks according to our exter-
nality measure. Overall, we find that NTMs significantly increase in number in presence of
both interest groups’ political pressure and government’s concern about potential damages
for consumers.
Our work brings some new insight to research on the political economy of NTMs, sug-
gesting that governments’ decisions on these measures may be driven by a protectionist
intent, as well as concerns about consumers’ well-being and the environment. This topic
may lead to further research. In the future, the trade effect of NTMs might be more
precisely estimated, with the aim of understanding whether the political economy deter-
minants differ between protectionist and non-protectionist measures. Furthermore, we
may also try to extend our theoretical framework, internalizing externality in consumers’
utility function, thus envisaging its direct impact on demand.
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Appendix A
Table 2.5: First Stage Results
Dependent Variables: Import Penetration ln
(Lobbying
V a
)
ln
(SafetyArticles
V a
)
NTMi 0.01 - -
(0.34) - -
% White Collar 9.43∗∗∗ - -
(7.67) - -
% Semiskilled 6.66∗∗∗ - -
(7.00) - -
% Unskilled -33.40∗∗ - -
(-2.77) - -
ln(NTMi) - 0.18
∗ 0.92∗∗∗
- (2.38) (5.66)
ln(ei) - -0.02 0.02
- (-0.67) (0.31)
ln
( 1
zi
)
- 0.02 0.09
- (0.87) (1.55)
ln
(Lobbyingexo
V a
)
- 0.33∗∗∗ -
- (8.05) -
ln
(Articlesexo
V a
)
- - 0.09***
- - (12.93)
Constant -5.41∗∗∗ -0.32* -2.36***
(-5.69) (-1.68) (-5.43)
Model F 18.63*** 24.08*** 49.98***
N 277 277 277
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at
1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and
ei is the absolute value of the import demand elasticity. Lobbyingexo accounts for lobbying
expenditures considered exogenous with respect to trade and regulations. Articlesexo is
built using LexisNexis news not listed under the topics “Safety” and “Environment”.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check: Alternative definition of the “Externality” indicator variable
Environment Consumer Reports
Dependent Variable:
NTMi 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 20th Percentile 40th Percentile
zi
ei
-0.285** -0.301** -0.171*** -0.168***
(-2.41) (-2.51) (-2.76) (-2.80)
zi
ei
∗ Ii 0.188** 0.209*** 0.096* 0.114**
(2.36) (2.62) (1.65) (2.03)
zi
ei
∗ Ei 0.263** 0.282** 0.161** 0.151**
(2.15) (2.20) (2.45) (2.27)
Concentration Index -0.104 -0.118 -0.092 -0.100
(-1.14) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.47)
% Union Members 0.028 0.054 0.131 0.137
(0.09) (0.17) (0.57) (0.59)
Capital
Labour
4.405 5.344 2.750 3.255
(0.55) (0.64) (0.46) (0.54)
Scale 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.027
(1.02) (0.99) (1.58) (1.60)
Constant 21.84*** 22.56*** 21.09*** 21.51***
(4.65) (4.57) (6.01) (6.07)
% I=1 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46
% E=1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
N 277 277 277 277
Model F*** 1.79* 1.90* 2.86*** 3.04***
AIC 18.32 18.41 18.01 18.02
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and ei is
absolute import elasticity. Percentile values of lobbying expenditures (from 10th to 40th) are
used to define the cutoff above which I is equal to 1. The cutoff to set E equal to 1 corresponds
to the 50th percentile value of our media variable.
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Table 2.7: Robustness Check: Alternative thresholds for the “Externality” indicator vari-
able
Dependent Variable:
NTMi 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 20th Percentile 40th Percentile
zi
ei
-0.229*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.146***
(-2.89) (-2.68) (-2.95) (-2.74)
zi
ei
∗ Ii 0.196*** 0.174*** 0.109* 0.099*
(3.11) (3.17) (1.86) (1.68)
zi
ei
∗ Ei 0.196** 0.148** 0.169*** 0.146**
(2.53) (2.09) (2.86) (2.32)
Concentration Index -0.121* -0.118* -0.096 -0.096
(-1.71) (-1.72) (-1.38) (-1.38)
% Union Members 0.137 0.145 0.132 0.143
(0.58) (0.63) (0.56) (0.61)
Capital
Labour
2.263 3.164 2.534 2.992
(0.37) (0.53) (0.41) (0.49)
Scale 0.030* 0.030* 0.029* 0.029*
(1.76) (1.80) (1.70) (1.70)
Constant 23.57*** 23.16*** 21.33*** 21.29***
(6.28) (6.39) (5.91) (5.90)
% I=1 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46
% E=1 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60
N 277 277 277 277
Model F 2.84*** 2.97*** 3.07*** 2.99***
AIC 15.60 15.54 15.61 15.60
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and ei is
absolute import elasticity. Percentile values of our media variable (from 10th to 40th) are used
to define the cutoff above which E is equal to 1. The cutoff to set I equal to 1 corresponds to
the 50th percentile value of lobbying expenditures.
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Table 2.8: Robustness Check: Exclusion of sectors with the lowest proportion of final
goods over total output
Excluding 10th percentile Excluding 20th Percentile
Dependent Variable:
NTMi 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 20th Percentile 40thPercentile
zi
ei
-0.233*** -0.221*** -0.258** -0.244**
(-2.71) (-2.64) (-2.51) (-2.45)
zi
ei
∗ Ii 0.113** 0.108* 0.110* 0.104*
(1.97) (1.86) (1.80) (1.70)
zi
ei
∗ Ei 0.239*** 0.230*** 0.261*** 0.250***
(3.01) (2.95) (2.78) (2.72)
Concentration Index -0.074 -0.072 -0.075 -0.072
(-0.96) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-0.86)
% Union Members 0.130 0.125 0.251 0.243
(0.52) (0.50) (0.88) (0.86)
Capital
Labour
1.403 1.447 1.846 1.938
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Scale 0.033* 0.034* 0.029 0.031
(1.84) (1.90) (1.40) (1.48)
Constant 20.12*** 20.25*** 19.81*** 19.87***
(5.12) (5.15) (4.53) (4.56)
% I=1 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.50
% E=1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
N 250 250 221 221
Model F 2.89*** 2.86*** 2.50** 2.48**
AIC 14.20 14.19 12.93 12.97
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses.
* denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
NTMi is computed as NTM prevalence ratio. zi is the inverse of import penetration, and ei is
absolute import elasticity. Percentile values of lobbying expenditures (from 10th to 40th) are
used to define the cutoff above which I is equal to 1. The cutoff to set E equal to 1 corresponds
to the 50th percentile value of our media variable.
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Table 2.9: List of issues selected to create the instrumental variable for lobbying
ORTHOGONAL ISSUES
ACCOUNTING
ADVERTISING
ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE
ARTS/ENTERTAINMENT
BANKING
BANKRUPTCY
BUDGET/APPROPRIATIONS
CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMMUNICATIONS/BROADCASTING/RADIO/TV
CONSTITUTION
DISASTER PLANNING/EMERGENCIES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EDUCATION
ENERGY/NUCLEAR
FAMILY ISSUES/ABORTION/ADOPTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS/INVESTMENTS/SECURITIES
GAMING/GAMBLING/CASINO
GOVERNMENT ISSUES
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSING
INDIAN/NATIVE AMERICAN AFFAIRS
INSURANCE
INTELLIGENCE
LAW ENFORCEMENT/CRIME/CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MEDIA (INFORMATION/PUBLISHING)
MEDICAL/DISEASE RESEARCH/CLINICAL LABS
MEDICARE/MEDICAID
MINTING/MONEY/GOLD STANDARD
POSTAL
RAILROADS
REAL ESTATE/LAND USE/CONSERVATION
RELIGION
RETIREMENT
ROADS/HIGHWAY
TAXATION/INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
URBAN DEVELOPMENT/MUNICIPALITIES
UTILITIES
VETERANS
WASTE (HAZARDOUS/SOLID/INTERSTATE/NUCLEAR)
WELFARE
CHAPTER 3
The Role of Political Ideology, Lobbying and Electoral Incentives in
Decentralized U.S. State Support of the Environment1
1This chapter is based on the paper “The Role of Political Ideology, Lobbying and Electoral Incentives
in Decentralized U.S. State Support of the Environment” by Lucia Pacca (L.A.S.E.R. Doctoral School, Uni-
versities of Milan, Pavia and Brescia), Gordon Rausser (University of California, Berkeley) and Alessandro
Olper (University of Milan and LICOS, KU University, Leuven)
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Abstract
This article investigates the influence of lobbying, electoral incentives, and the ideology of
U.S. state governors on environmental expenditures. A theoretical framework is presented,
emphasizing that the potential impact of lobbying and messaging from interest groups on
environmental policies depends on the ideology of governors. Implementing a Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD), we identify and estimate the causal effect of state governors
on the level of environmental expenditures. We test whether governors tend to deviate
from their own political ideology when facing pressures from polluting lobbies and electoral
incentives from environmental organizations. The empirical results reveal that, when
Democratic governors are in charge, environmental expenditures are, on average, higher.
However, in oil-abundant states, Democratic politicians tend to allocate fewer resources
to environmental preservation, suggesting that political pressure from lobbying groups
matters.
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3.1 Introduction
Given the withdrawal of the U.S. federal government from the Paris Climate Accord and
the current governance structure of the federal Environmental Protection Agency, the role
of decentralized state governments’ support of the environment has become increasingly
important. Indeed, governors have a substantial degree of autonomy in deciding the por-
tion of a state’s budget allocated to the conservation of natural resources. Given their
central role, governors are subject to political pressures from alternative, self-interested
sources. On the one hand, they are subject to lobbying from corporate groups, which are
usually interested in lowering the level of environmental regulations. On the other hand,
the sensitivity of voters towards environmental issues has been increasing as a consequence
of the intensification of the worldwide debate on climate change and the effect of emis-
sions and other types of pollution (see, for example, Herrnstadt and Muehlegger (2014)).
Generally, environmental organizations invest in organizing and expanding “green” voters,
bringing environmental issues to the attention of politicians and acting largely through
public persuasion and demonstrations.
The political economy determinants of environmental policies has been extensively
studied by theoretical and empirical literature (see Oates and Portney (2003) for a survey).
However, given the complexity of the policy formation process, most of the studies analyze
single determinants of environmental regulations rather than considering how different
factors interact with each other. Within the literature about the political economy of
environmental policies, the paper by List and Sturm (2006) is of particular interest. Their
work focuses on the impact of electoral incentives on state governments’ environmental
policies, showing that governors, when facing reelection, are conditioned by the preferences
of their state’s voters. More specifically, in “green” states (where citizens have higher
sensitivity towards the environment), even a “brown” governor, whose ideology is closer
to industrialists, could decide to implement environmentalist policies with the objective
of attracting voters. The model by Yu (2005), in addition to analyzing effects of voter
preferences, focuses also on the effects of lobbying from interest groups. Yu (2005) shows
that governments set the optimal environmental policy in response to political pressures
from interest groups - industrialists and environmentalists - as well as preferences of the
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median voter.
In our model, we integrate the seminal papers by List and Sturm (2006) and Yu (2005)
and incorporate new data to examine U.S. states governors’ support of the environment.
As with earlier work, we draw a sharp distinction between electoral incentives versus
lobbying incentives in the policy formation process orchestrated by the ideology of the
“center” of the governance structure in each state. According to our framework, indus-
trialist lobbies exert significant political pressure on governors with weaker environmental
sensitivity, while the converse holds for environmentalist lobbies. In this paper, we assign
ideology according to governors’ party affiliation, hypothesizing that Democrats are more
environmentally friendly than Republicans. Environmental support, or the results of the
policy formation process, is measured in terms of environmental expenditures.
Our analysis on environmental expenditures across the various U.S. states covers the
sample period 1980-2014. In addition to investigating the impact of a governor’s party on
environmental expenditures, we test whether a governor’s behavior is affected by political
contributions from polluting industries or environmental groups, both of whom allocate
resources to lobbying and/or persuasive messaging to voting citizens. This allows us to
examine whether states’ governors tend to deviate from their ideology when they are
subjected to strong lobbying pressures, electoral incentives, or both. To address the endo-
geneity issue of governors’ parties, we implement a Regression Discontinuity Design. This
framework emphasizes elections where the margin of victory between Democratic and Re-
publican candidates was very close to zero. Our modelling structure exploits quasi-random
variation in winners and identifies a causal effect.
Based on the data utilized and on our theoretical political economic framework, the
empirical results reveal that Democratic governors receive, on average, fewer contribu-
tions from polluting sectors than Republican governors. Moreover, we find that, when
a state is governed by a Democratic candidate, the portion of the budget spent on the
environment tends to be higher with respect to years when the governor is a Republican.
However, the effect is highly heterogeneous across states. In particular, the larger the oil
reserves of a given state, the more Democratic governors will deviate from their ideology,
allocating fewer resources to the preservation of the environment and the enforcement of
environmental regulations.
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Our analysis integrates the major political economic forces of electoral incentives, self-
interested lobbying, and ideology as the potential determinants of individual state envi-
ronmental policies. Our presentation unfolds with a review of the critical literature related
to our analysis in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we illustrate the theoretical framework of
our political economic analysis of environmental policies. Section 3.4 presents the data
employed. Our identification strategy and the empirical results are contained in Sections
3.5 and 3.6, respectively. In Section 3.7, we present robustness tests and an evaluation of
our identification strategy. Finally, Section 3.8 provides some concluding remarks.
3.2 Relevant Literature
Two seminal papers inform our political economic theoretical framework. The first is the
excellent paper by List and Sturm (2006) that examines the role of electoral incentives
on U.S. environmental expenditures. The emphasis is on whether politicians, who are
concerned about elections, tend to shape policies to attract the most possible votes. More
specifically in “green” states, where citizens have high sensitivities to the environment,
will even a “brown” governor, whose ideology is more aligned with industrialists, decide
to implement environmental policies with the objective of attracting voters? In essence,
a “brown” governor, who may have a personal preference against environmental policies,
may well implement a “green” policy when this improves the probability of being elected.
List and Sturm (2006) discover evidence confirming their hypothesis, finding that the level
of environmental expenditure differs between years in which a governor can be reelected
and years in which a governor is term-limited. However, missing from the List and Sturm
(2006) formulation are the lobbying efforts of self-interested polluting firms, which are
structured to counter the actions of electoral incentives that are potentially influenced by
environmental interest groups.
The second seminal paper incorporates the lobbying efforts of both industrialized and
environmental interest groups. In this insightful theoretical framework by Yu (2005), not
yet empirically tested, the governmental policy process in setting environmental expendi-
tures is influenced by two types of interest groups: polluting industries and environmental
organizations. While the first group acts mainly through direct lobbying such as monetary
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donations to politicians, the latter group is more efficient at carrying out indirect lobbying
designed to influence electoral incentives that are linked to the preferences of the median
voter. Yu (2005) structures his formulation in three stages: In the first stage, lobbyists
act through indirect actions, sending messages to citizens to influence their preferences.
Since political candidates take into account the policy preferred by the median voter,
whose beliefs are influenced by messages, interest groups indirectly affect the decisions of
the elected officials. Direct lobbying takes place in the second stage to directly influence
government policy. Finally, in the third stage, the government chooses its preferred policy,
taking into account both contributions from lobbying and the preferences of the median
voter. Missing from the Yu (2005) formulation is the critical role of ideology.
Our proposed integration of the two seminal papers, List and Sturm (2006) and Yu
(2005), in the context of environmental policies is very much aligned with the general con-
ceptual framework advanced for governmental policies by Besley and Coate (2001). In this
formulation, even though ideology is not highlighted, the authors argue that the citizen-
candidate model of representative democracy must be combined with the menu-auction
model of lobbying advanced by Grossman and Helpman (1994). In their formulation,
Besley and Coate (2001) argue that interest group political pressure and electoral compe-
tition should be considered jointly whenever examining the governmental policy-making
process. These two forces, in their formulation, interact to determine the actual policy-
making process. Here too, however, the ideology of political leaders is not emphasized.
In the context of environmental policies, our work is also related to a strand of litera-
ture studying the political economy determinants of environmental regulations. Much of
this research is summarized in Oates and Portney (2003), who provide a review of both
theoretical and empirical approaches to the evaluation of environmental policy-making.
This body of research shows that interest groups influence environmental regulations, but
also that voters’ preferences and social benefits play an important role.
The role of interest groups has been extensively studied in the context of environmental
policies. Ackerman and Hassler (1981), for example, highlight the role that “dirty” indus-
tries, in particular the coal sector, had in the structure of the Clean Air Act in the United
States. More recently, Fredriksson (1997) builds a model showing how interest groups
shape pollution taxes. His theoretical framework suggests that the political equilibrium
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tax rate on pollution differs from the Pigouvian rate. This finding can be partly explained
by the fact that a government faces lobbying pressures from both environmentalists and
industrialists, who can form lobbying groups that offer incentives to the government in
return for a particular policy selection. The work of Aidt (1998) argues that political com-
petition is an important source for the internalization of economic externalities. Indeed,
some lobby groups adjust their economic objectives to reflect environmental concerns,
which translates into a Pigouvian adjustment of policies set by the government. Both
Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998) draw from the literature on the political economy of
trade policies, formalized in Hillman (1982), Grossman and Helpman (1994), and Rausser
et al. (2011). In these models, a government sets policies maximizing a function that
includes both social welfare and political contributions from interest groups.
Our paper is also related to a body of literature on the influence of electoral incen-
tives on environmental policies. These works draw from the median voter theory by
Downs (1957), who argues that policy decisions made by elected representatives converge
towards the preferences of voters. An application of the median voter model to envi-
ronmental policies is presented by McAusland (2003), who focuses on the links among
inequality, openness to trade, and environmental regulations. Fredriksson and Millimet
(2004) study the formation of environmental standards in majoritarian vs. proportional
electoral systems. In this analysis, under majoritarian rule, when politicians only need to
be elected by 50% of voters, there is less incentive to maximize voters’ welfare and, thus,
to enact effective environmental policies.
On a range of different state government policies, other literature has been published
on how politicians from different parties (Republicans vs. Democrats) implement non-
environmental economic policies in the United States. Reed (2006) finds that the legisla-
tors’ parties influence tax burdens; when states’ legislatures are controlled by Democrats,
taxes are, on average, higher. Tax policies are also studied by Fredriksson et al. (2013),
who use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to account for the endogeneity associ-
ated with a governor’s party affiliation. Their work finds that Democratic governors raise
income taxes more than their Republican counterparts, but this difference only holds when
governors can be reelected (namely, when they do not face term limits). Lee et al. (2004)
use an RDD for congressional elections, showing that party affiliation significantly matters
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for congressional voting behavior. The same identification strategy is also used by Beland
(2015), who evaluates labor policies, finding that Democratic governors tend to implement
policies aimed at reducing the income and labor participation gap between black and white
workers. Finally, Besley et al. (2010) test a model for political competition, showing that,
when competition is higher, all political parties implement growth-promoting policies as
opposed to special-interest policies.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework presented below relies on Yu (2005), whose model, based on
the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework, investigates the political economy deter-
minants of electoral incentives and lobbying on environmental policy. In addition to the
determinants identified by Yu (2005), we include governors’ ideology as another determi-
nant influencing environmental policy. As previously noted, our policy variable of interest
is the level of environmental expenditures. Within a state, the governor, located at the
center of governance structuring, is the fundamental actor of policy making. His role is
crucial for determining environmental expenditures, which are aimed at preserving parks,
forests, and other natural resources as well as regulating industries’ polluting activities.
Environmental expenditures will affect, in turn, the level of emissions:
e = Z(g) (3.1)
where the level of emissions is indicated by e, the level of expenditures by g and Z is a
decreasing function of g.
As in Yu (2005), the production function F (L,K) is characterized by constant returns
to scale (CRS). Emission abatement, expressed as A(e), leads to a decrease in produced
units of good x:
X = [1−A(e)]F (L,K) (3.2)
where X is net output of good x with pollution abatement, and the cost of environmental
regulations is represented by the termA(e). A(e) is decreasing in emissions, withA(e)′ < 0.
As a consequence, given the definition of emissions in (3.1), we find by the chain rule that
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dA/dg > 0.
Individuals are characterized by the following utility function:
Ui = x0 + u(x)−Di(eX) (3.3)
where x0 is consumption of the numeraire good and u(x) is the utility coming from con-
sumption of good x. Di(eX) is the negative externality coming from pollution, where eX
is the total amount of pollution associated with the production of good X. The disu-
tility of pollution is defined as Di(eX) = µid(eX), where µi is individual i’s subjective
belief. An individual with high µi will be more sensitive to environmental issues than an
individual with low µi. The indirect utility function of individual i is obtained as follows:
Vi(Yi, e) = s(e) + Yi − µid(e) (3.4)
where Yi is income and s(e) is consumer surplus of consuming good x, which is increasing
in e, since the price of the good is decreasing in e (dp/de < 0). If each individual provides
one unit of labour, and we normalize the wage rate to one, then the level of emission for
individual i will be given by:
ei = arg max
e
{Vi = s(e) + 1− µid(e)} (3.5)
In this formulation, society is composed of three different groups: the general public
(represented by the median voter), environmentalists and industrialists. We designate the
median voter as p, environmentalists as E and industrialists as I. We define the policy
preferred by the median voter as ep, and its subjective belief as µp. Environmentalists
have a stronger subjective belief µE > µp. This group will prefer a lower level of emissions
than the median voter (eE < ep) and, as a consequence, a higher level of environmental
expenditures (gE > gp). The third group of people, industrialists, own the specific factor
and will thus have the following optimal level of emissions:
VI = arg max
e
{
s(e) + 1 +
pi(p(e), e)
NI
− µId(e)
}
(3.6)
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where pi is profit earned by the industrialists NI . The level of emissions preferred by this
third group, eI , is higher than ep. Both industrialists and environmentalists are organized
as special interest groups, which lobby the governor.
When setting the level of environmental expenditures, the governor is driven by several
forces:
Gj = bEjCEj(ej) + bIiCIj(ej)− ajM(ej − ep) (3.7)
where Gj is the objective function of governor j; C represents contributions from interest
groups (I, industrialist, and E, environmentalist); and M is a measure of general welfare,
adjusted by the political cost of deviating from the median voter’s preferred level of pollu-
tion ep. Finally, aj is the weight given to general welfare by governor j. If j is the governor
of a “green” state (borrowing the definition presented by List and Sturm (2006)), where
citizens are more concerned about the environment, then ep will be higher. Accordingly,
the political cost to the governor will depend on whether a state is “green” or “brown”.
Moreover, ep can also be influenced by indirect lobbying (messaging) conducted by interest
groups engaging in persuasion actions directed to voters. As argued by Yu (2005), this
second form of lobbying can modify the median voter’s belief µp, resulting in a shift in her
preferred policy. Yu (2005) argues that this second form of resources allocation by interest
groups is particularly relevant for the environmentalist interest group, which is generally
more effective at persuading the public relative to a governor’s lobbying contributions.
Governors mediate between the interests of environmentalist vs. industrialists groups,
and the policies preferred by the median voters. Moreover, we include governor’s ideology
in the objective function in a similar fashion to Rausser et al. (2011). Ideology is captured
by the governor specific parameters bI and bE , which represent the relative power of the
two interest groups in their attempts to influence environmental policy. If governor j is
very much ideologically driven towards the environment, then he will be more sensitive to
lobbying from the environmentalist interest group and less sensitive to lobbying from the
industrialist interest group (bEj > bIj). Conversely, if the governor is ideologically closer
to industrialist group, then bIj will be higher than bEj . From (3.1), we can re-express
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(3.7) as follows:
Gj = bEjCEj(Z(g)) + bIjCIj(Z(g))− ajM(Z(g)− ep) (3.8)
Thus, equilibrium level of environmental expenditures will be given by:
g◦ = arg max
g
{bEjCE(Z(g)) + bIjCI(Z(g))− ajM(Z(g)− ep)} (3.9)
The equilibrium expenditures policy g◦ will be given by the following first order condition2:
bEjW
′
E(Z(g
◦)) + bIjW ′I(Z(g
◦))− ajM ′(Z(g◦)− ep) = 0 (3.10)
where the truthful contribution schedule is imposed, i.e. C ′ω = W ′ω for ω = E, I. The
derivatives of interest groups’ welfare with respect to expenditures represents the economic
“stake” of each group in environmental policy. The larger the marginal gain in welfare
from the policy, the more the interest group contributes at the margin.
Note that if |bEjW ′E | > |bIjW ′I |, the environmentalist group will have a greater impact
on policy than the industrialist group, and Z(g◦) < ep, which implies that the preferred
level of environmental expenditures will be higher than the one preferred by the median
voter (g◦ > gp). Conversely, if |bIjW ′I | > |bEjW ′E |, the industrialist group will be more
influential, and g◦ will be lower than gp.
In contrast to Yu (2005), interest groups’ political influence not only depends on their
relative “stake” in environmental policy, but also on the magnitude of bIj and bEj , which
are linked to the ideology of governor j. In other words, the same amount of contributions
will affect an environmentalist governor less than a governor with neutral preferences
towards the environment. If we hypothesize that governors from different parties have
different ideologies, and specifically that Democratic governors are more sensitive to the
environment than Republican governors, we should expect bE to be higher for the former.
As a consequence, we should expect that, ceteris paribus, Democratic governors will select
2The first order condition in (3.10) comes from simplification of the following derivative, obtained by
applying the chain rule:
bEjW
′
E(Z(g
◦)) ∗ Z′(g◦) + bIjW ′I(Z(g◦)) ∗ Z′(g◦) − ajM ′(Z(g◦) − ep) ∗ Z′(g◦) = 0
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a higher level of expenditures than Republican governors. Along similar lines, we expect
that contributions from industrialist interest groups are more effective at persuading a
governor with high bI , while donations from environmentalists have greater effectiveness
at influencing a governor with high bE . As a consequence, if interest groups maximize
the effectiveness of their contributions, we might expect industrialists to give more con-
tributions to Republican governors, and environmentalists to donate more to Democratic
governors.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Environmental Expenditures
As a measure of environmental expenditures, we use per capita environmental expendi-
tures. This variable, employed by List and Sturm (2006), is taken from the annual Census
publication State Government Finances, and is available in every year of our sample pe-
riod (1980-2014). We aggregate in a single variable expenditures for “fish and game,”
“forests and parks,” and “other natural resources.” According to the definitions from
State Government Finances, these expenditures include the portion of a state’s budget
which is allocated to the development and conservation of natural resources, as well as to
the regulation of productive activities affecting the environment3.
Analyzing the role of governors’ parties on environmental expenditures is particularly
relevant since state governments have a substantial degree of autonomy with respect to
the federal government in deciding degree of environmental support. Within the decisional
process of each single state, the governor plays a vital role, given the assigned executive
authority. Specifically, the governor is in charge of the state budget and appropriations
approval, and, in some states, he also has veto power that can be used for the removal
3More specifically, the Census defines expenditures on fish and game as expenditures for the “conser-
vation, improvement, development, and propagation of fish and game resources; and the regulation and
enforcement of fish and game laws and rules.” Expenditures on forests are defined as expenditures for the
“conservation, development, management, and protection of forests and forest resources; regulation and
inspection of forest products and industries; and provision of assistance to private or local government
owners of woodlands.” Expenditures on parks are defined as “provision and support of recreational and
cultural scientific facilities maintained for the benefit of residents and visitors.” Finally, expenditures on
other natural resources include the “conservation, promotion, and development of natural resources (soil,
water, energy, minerals, etc.) and the regulation of industries which develop, utilize, or affect natural
resources.”
CHAPTER 3. ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES, IDEOLOGYAND LOBBYING59
of appropriations to which he objects. Accordingly, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
governors’ ideology matters for environmental expenditure policies.
3.4.2 Lobbying Data
Lobbying data at the U.S. state level come from the National Institute on Money in State
Politics. The Institute collects lobbying contributions targeting candidates running for all
U.S. state elections. To the best of our knowledge, this source of data has not yet been
used with any empirical political economy literature. The principal advantage of this data
is that they include a sectoral classification, allowing us to disentangle lobbying from the
major polluting industries. In particular, the National Institute on Money in State Poli-
tics classifies lobbying data into three types of expenditures: contributions from Political
Action Committees (PACs), lobbying spending, and independent spending. We only use
contributions from PACs, since they have longer time availability (2000-2014) and they are
regulated by laws that do not change across states. Contributions are monetary donations
which can be given to three different types of recipients: candidates, party committees, or
ballot measures committees. While candidates and party committees can be associated
with a specific party (Democratic, Republican, or third party), ballot measure committees
cannot be matched to political parties and are excluded from our analysis. Moreover, the
affiliation party of each candidate is reported4.
In order to disentangle contributions from polluting industries, we use rankings of
sectors according to the level of toxic releases and waste. Rankings are taken from the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI). The contributions of different sectors to total waste production
and total release of toxic substances are shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, reported in Appendix
A. According to TRI, which is based on the NAICS classification, a majority (66%) of
chemical waste is produced by three sectors: chemical manufacturing, primary metals,
and petroleum products manufacturing. As for toxic releases, we can observe that almost
two-thirds are originated by three industry sectors: metal mining, chemical manufacturing
and electric utilities. Matching the NAICS classification from TRI with sectors defined
by the National Institute on Money in State Politics, we note that almost all the top
4We exclude from our data candidates affiliated to independent parties, considering only Democratic
and Republican politicians.
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Table 3.1: Political Contributions by Candidates’ Party and Type of Industry, 2010
Democratic Party (#) Republican Party (#)
Candidates 5,708 6,094
Governors 59 90
Lieutenant Governors 73 105
House Members 1,155 1,226
Senate Members 4,429 4,684
General Elections 4,541 4,595
Primary Elections 1,166 1,499
All Candidates
Mean of Contributions from
All Industries $ 15,721 (155,643) $ 20,037 (670,120)
Mean of Contributions from
Polluting Industries $ 7,079 (44,534) $ 11,712 (142,299)
Governors Only
Mean of Contributions from
All Industries $ 244,586 (919,166) $ 398,887 (4,577,592)
Mean of Contributions from
Polluting Industries $ 76,906 (292,677) $ 152,559 ( 779,962)
Notes: Data are taken from the National Institute on Money in State Politics.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
polluting sectors are included in the category “Energy and Natural Resources.” Only
the chemical industry is associated with a separate sector, named “Chemical and Related
Manufacturing.” We use the two above sectors to define the group “Polluting Industries.”
Table 3.1 shows sample means for contributions data for a representative year, 2010.
The sample includes 11,802 candidates, equally divided between Democrats and Repub-
licans. Most of the candidates seek office as House and Senate members, while only 193
run for gubernatorial elections. Candidates for both general and primary elections are
considered, with the former outnumbering the latter. For political contributions’ sample
means, note that contributions given to Republican candidates are higher than contri-
butions given to Democratic candidates and that this difference is bigger when it comes
to “polluting” industries. Moreover, the table shows that governors receive, on average,
much higher contributions than all the other candidates.
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3.4.3 Other Variables
Data on governors’ political parties, margins of victory and information on term limits are
taken from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Elections. Data on U.S. states’ income, population,
and age characteristics of residents come from the Census Bureau. The variable accounting
for the number of green voters comes from List and Sturm (2006) and consists of the
number of members of the largest United States environmental organizations (Sierra Club,
National Wildlife Federation, and Greenpeace). We construct this variable from 1987
membership data. Finally, data on proven oil reserves is sourced from the EIA (Energy
Information Administration). Reserves are measured in barrels and available for all U.S.
states. We weight oil reserves by a state’s area in order to rule out potential effects due
to a state’s size.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for all variables employed in our model. Our sam-
ple, covering the period 1980-2014, consists of 48 states and 1617 observations, equally di-
vided between years when Democratic governors are in charge and years when Republican
governors hold office. From the sample means, note that per capita environmental expen-
ditures are lower under Republican governors ($35.4), than under Democratic governors
($33.29). Moreover, we also report summary statistics for various characteristics (popula-
tion, income, age of population) for elected Democratic versus Republican governors, as
well as for the time-invariant variables (percentage of “green” voters and area-weighted
oil reserves).
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is stuctured as follows. We first conduct an exploratory analy-
sis, where we relate candidates’ party affiliation to contributions from industrial lobbies.
This exploratory analysis is designed to investigate whether a relationship exists between
political parties (Democratic vs. Republican) and the pattern of contributions.
Subsequently, we concentrate on investigating the relationship between the ideology
of states’ governors, lobbying, and environmental expenditures. As emphasized by our
theoretical framework, we hypothesize that expenditures depend both on the personal
preferences of governors and political pressures from interest groups and voters. Our
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Sample Means, Main Variables
Democratic Governors Republican Governors
Environmental Expenditures
(per capita 1984 real $) 35.5 (29.75) 33.29 (27.46)
Margin of Victory 16.90 (13.45) -15.78 (13.23)
Population (Mn) 52.17 (52.74) 61.17 (67.63)
% Over 65 years 11.25 (3.98) 10.98 (4.51)
% Under 18 years 18.45 (1.73) 18.70 (1.77)
% Green Voters (1987) 0.87 (0.37) 0.80 (0.33)
Oil Reserves (1980)
(barrels/area) 3,189 (9,588) 5,051 (12,682)
Terms 224 220
Years with Term Limit 210 196
Observations 815 802
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Margin of Victory is computed
as the difference between the percentage of votes given to the Democratic candidates
and the percentage of votes given to the Republican candidate.
first purpose is to evaluate whether Democrats implement more environmentally-friendly
policies as compared to Republicans, as conventional wisdom holds. Our second purpose is
to test whether governors tend to deviate from their own ideology in response to lobbying
pressures and/or electoral incentives.
To address the endogeneity of party affiliation, we implement a Regression Discontinu-
ity Design (RDD), which allows a causal effect to be inferred. To address the endogeneity
of lobbying, we extend the baseline model by testing for potential heterogeneity effects
of governors’ parties across states, interacting the party variable with time-invariant vari-
ables on the amount of oil reserves (used as a proxy for the power of major polluters’
lobbies). We also interact the party dummy variable with characteristics of voters and the
existence of a term limit for the governor (used as a proxy for the existence of electoral
incentives).
Our analysis of both components is conducted on all 48 lower U.S. states. We exclude
Hawaii and Alaska because of their exceptional dependence on federal funds. For our major
empirical analysis (the second component), we consider a 35-year period (from 1980 to
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2014), which allows comparison of a high number of gubernatorial terms.
3.5.1 Empirical Specification
To investigate how ideology and contributions affect environmental expenditures across
U.S. states, we would test the following specification:
Yst = α+ β1Dst + β2Dst ∗ Cst + γ′Xst + δs + φt + st (3.11)
where the dependent variable, Y , is the amount of per capita environmental expenditures
in state s and year t. D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor is a Democrat, and 0
if she is a Republican. C is a variable accounting for the amount of electoral contributions
received by governor of state s and year t from the most polluting sectors. Finally, X is
a vector of controls, δs accounts for state fixed effects, φt for time fixed effects, and st is
the error term.
However, in estimating equation 3.11, we might encounter two potential different en-
dogeneity issues. First, as already noted in previous literature (see, for example, Beland
(2015) and Fredriksson et al. (2013)), political ideology could be endogenous resulting from
omitted variable bias. In our specific case, there may be some variables influencing both
votes in gubernatorial elections and environmental expenditures. This may be the case,
for example, of some preferences of voters, as well as economic shocks affecting specific
states. If an economic shock happening in state s at time t affected the spending behavior
of politicians, and at the same time influenced voting behavior of citizens, then the ide-
ology of the governor and the level of expenditures would be related due to factors that
are not included in equation 3.11. Second, political contributions might be endogenous
because of a reverse causality with environmental expenditures. Indeed, lobbying behavior
of polluting firms could be a response to stricter or looser environmental regulations.
To address the above potential sources of endogeneity and the difficulty of isolating ap-
propriate instuments, we implement a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Lee (2008)
demonstrates that focusing on close elections provides quasi-random variation in winners,
allowing an identification of the causal effect of party affiliation on political outcomes.
Our treatment variable is an indicator which is equal to 1 for Democratic governors and
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0 for Republican governors. Our “forcing” variable is the Democratic margin of victory,
given by the difference between the percentage of votes received by the Democratic can-
didate and the percentage of votes received by the Republican candidate. The threshold,
representing the cutoff between Democratic and Republican victory, corresponds to zero
margin of victory. This methodology has been previously implemented by Beland (2015)
and Lee et al. (2004) investigating other political economic processes.
As exogenous proxy for lobbying, we use the time-invariant amount of oil reserves
across states, that is interacted with the political party indicator variable. This results in
a heterogeneous RDD along the line of Becker et al. (2013), allowing us to asses whether
the effect of belonging to the Democratic party (as opposed to the Republican party)
varies with the presence of lobbying groups from polluting sectors.
Instead of using a non-parametric RDD, which only allows using observations close to
the threshold, we use a parametric specification that accounts for all observations, both
close and far away from the threshold.
Our RDD is specified as follows:
Yst = α+β1Dst+β2Dst∗Oils+β3Dst∗Es+F (MVst)+Fb(MVst)∗Dst+δs+φt+st (3.12)
where D is a dummy variable equal to one if the governor of state s in year t is a Democrat
and zero if he is a Republican. The state-specific variable Oil, that we find interacted with
D, accounts for time-invariant oil reserves, estimated at the beginning of the period and
normalized by a states’ area. This variable is used as exogenous proxy for the power of
polluting lobbies in a specific state. MV is the margin of victory of the Governor, and
F (MV ) is a polynomial function of the margin of victory. For F (MV ), we investigate
first, second, third, and fourth order polynomials. State fixed effects (δs) and time fixed
effects (φt) are included in (3.12), and the error term is st.
The use of different polynomial forms for MV is based on Lee and Lemieux (2010).
Their analysis recognizes that, since we cannot know a priori which specification produces
the smallest bias and best approximates the data, the most appropriate solution is to test
different parametric forms in order to check for the robustness of results5.
5We do not include additional covariates in equation 3.12, since, according to the RDD theory by Lee
and Lemieux (2010), their inclusion should not affect the results if the model is well specified. This only
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For the inclusion of the interaction term between party affiliation and oil reserves,
we rely on Becker et al. (2013), who first theoretically specified the heterogeneous RDD
model. The use of a state’s estimated oil reserves (Oils) as proxy for industrial lobbies’
power has several advantages. First, the heterogeneous RDD requires interaction terms
to be continuous about the forcing variable at the threshold. This would not be the
case for political contributions, which have a strong relationship with politicians’ ideology.
Moreover, using political contributions would also be fraught with potential endogeneity.
By contrast, oil reserves are exogenous by construction since they depend on geographical
characteristics of states.
To account for electoral incentives, we use two different interaction terms, indicated by
E in 3.12. First, we investigate whether the effect of political parties differs between years
when governors face a term limit and years when they are, instead, eligible for re-election.
The idea of using term limits as a potential determinant is based on existing literature.
In particular, List and Sturm (2006), find that states’ environmental expenditures differ
between years when governors are term limited and years when they can run for re-election.
Fredriksson et al. (2013) found that term limits significantly matter in determining states’
tax policies. The intuition is that, when a politician can no longer be elected, she may
tend to implement less populist policies, since she is less interested in increasing voters’
support. Second, we use an interaction variable, taken from List and Sturm (2006),
accounting for the number of “green” voters as a percentage of states’ population. Green
voters are defined as those people who are members of one of the three largest U.S.
environmentalist organizations (Greenpeace, the Sierra Club and the National Wildlife
Federation). As in List and Sturm (2006), we use a time-invariant variable built from
1987 membership data. While the number of green voters over time could be influenced
by lobbying from environmentalist associations, the use of a variable measured in the
initial period attenuates this potential endogeneity problem.
holds if the covariates are balanced at the threshold, which we show holds in our robustness checks section.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Preliminary Evidence from Political Contributions
We first explore the link between the ideology of the members of states’ legislatures and
the contributions they receive from polluting industry groups. Indeed, the pattern of
contributions can give us some indication about the ideology of politicians. We focus
on testing whether there is a relationship between the level of oil reserves across states
and the amount of contributions from polluting sectors. This tells us whether states’
oil reserves are a good exogenous proxy for the contributions from lobbies. Note that
the existence of a correlation between politicians’ parties and political contributions is
already evident in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Here, using contributions data from the National
Institute on Money in State Politics, we find that environmentalist associations mainly give
money to Democratic candidates, while polluting industry groups allocate most of their
lobbying resources to Republicans. Moreover, the contributions from environmentalists
are much smaller in magnitude than contributions from industries. (In particular, we
show in Figure 3.2 donations from the “Energy and Natural Resources” sector, which
includes most of the industries classified as polluting.) This first result seems to confirm
what has been theoretically suggested by Yu (2005), namely that polluting industrial
groups are more efficient at direct lobbying as compared to indirect actions such as public
persuasion, while the reverse holds for environmentalists. In Table 3.3, the results are
reported from the estimation of an OLS regression, mainly aimed at testing the relationship
between the ideology of state candidates and contributions from polluting industries6. To
evaluate this relationship, we use a dataset structure combining all possible candidate-
industry pairs and consider all candidates running for office within state legislatures and all
industries classified by the Institute on Money in States Politics. The analysis is performed
on elections from the year 2010. Results show that, even if Democratic candidates are
6The estimated baseline equation is the following:
Ln(Contributionsip) = α+ β1Polli + β2Dp + β3Polli ∗Dp + δX ′p + σs + cp (3.13)
where the dependent variable is the amount of money (in logarithm) given by contributors in sector i
to politician p. Polli is a dummy variable indicating whether sector i is a polluting industry; Dp is an
indicator variable equal to 1 when politician p is a Democrat, and to 0 when he is a Republican. Xp is a
vector of control variables specific to politician p; finally, σs accounts for state fixed effects, and ip is the
error term.
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Figure 3.1: Source: Authors’ calculation from National Institute on Money in States’
Politics
Figure 3.2: Source: Authors’ calculation from National Institute on Money in States’
Politics
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associated, on average, with higher contributions as compared to Republican politicians
for all the other industries, this relationship is inverted for “polluting” sectors. In other
words, these industries give more contributions to Republicans as compared to Democrats,
as shown by the coefficient on the interaction term between the “Democrat” dummy
variable and the “Polluting Sector” indicator. Furthermore, contributions from polluting
sectors significantly increase with a state’s estimated oil reserves. This is in line with the
distribution of contributions across industries displayed in Figure 3.3, showing that the
oil sector is, among polluter industries, the sector donating the most to politicians. All
results are robust to the inclusion of different fixed effects (state, industry and candidate)
and control variables (general vs. primary elections; governors vs. members of the House
or Senate).
Figure 3.3: Contributions from Polluting Sectors by Industry
In the Appendix, we show results from evaluating such relationship through a linear
probability model instead of an OLS and from using a different time period (2000 instead
of 2010). In all cases, the core results are robust.
The empirical results from Table 3.3 can be explained by the fact that Democrats
might have a more environmentalist ideology as compared to Republicans, attracting more
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Political Contributions, 2010
Dependent Variable
ln(Contributions) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 0.153∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.152∗ -
(1.87) (2.12) (1.86) -
Polluting Sector -1.270∗∗∗ -5.304∗∗∗ -5.314∗∗∗ -1.271∗∗∗
(-16.26) (-27.05) (-27.20) (-15.87)
Democrat*Polluting Sector -0.600∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗
(-9.68) (-9.66) (-9.66) (-9.58)
Polluting Sector*Oil 0.041∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(3.96) (3.70) (3.96) (4.23)
Democrat*Polluting Sector*Oil -0.025∗∗ -0.021∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(-2.22) (-1.82) (-2.22) (-2.71)
House Member -3.444∗∗∗ -3.319∗∗∗ -3.443∗∗∗ -
(-10.91) (-11.25) (-10.91) -
Senate Member -2.572∗∗∗ -2.569∗∗∗ -2.571∗∗∗ -
(-7.97) (-8.01) (-7.97) -
General Election 2.319∗∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ -
(31.13) (11.21) (31.16) -
Ln(Oil) - 0.037∗∗ - -
- (2.39) - -
Constant 5.309∗∗∗ 7.674∗∗∗ 7.717∗∗∗ 3.854∗∗∗
(14.38) (24.44) (19.75) (527.91)
State F.E. Yes No Yes -
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes No
Candidate F.E. No No No Yes
N 237,461 237,461 237,461 237,461
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
candidate level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. ***
denotes significance at 1%.
The variable Oil is weighted by states’ area.
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contributions from ideological environmental groups and fewer donations from polluting
industries. This explanation would be in line with previous findings from the literature
as well as with the theoretical framework outlined in Section 3.3, where the link between
ideology and contributions has been shown within the political science literature. In
particular, Barber (2016) shows that individual contributors rank ideological concerns as
highly important when deciding whom to give money to. Bonica (2014) argues that the
pattern of contributions can be used to define the ideology of candidates. Finally, Bertrand
et al. (2014) find that ideological affinity between lobbyists and candidates is an important
determinant of lobbying patterns at the federal level.
3.6.2 Principal Results
The main focus of our empirical analysis consists of investigating the causal impact of
the party affiliation of the governor on state expenditures on environment and natural
resources. Specifically, we evaluate whether and how governors deviate from their ideology
in response to lobbying interests and electoral incentives. Figure 3.4 plots a correlation
graph between political contributions received by state governors from polluting sectors
and environmental expenditures over the period 2000-2014. The figure shows that there
is a negative correlation between these two variables, suggesting that governors receiving
higher contributions are associated with lower expenditures on the conservation of the
environment and regulation of polluting activities. It is not possible to infer, from a
simple correlation, to what extent the relationship is attributable to governors’ parties
and to what extent it is due to political contributions themselves. Indeed, as we have
shown, there is a strong association between contributions and whether a candidate is
affiliated with the Democratic or Republican party.
Table 3.4 reports results from the Regression Discontinuity Design model specified
in equation 3.12. We first test an RDD where the only dependent variable of interest
is an indicator equal to 1 for Democratic governors and to 0 for Republican governors.
We choose a parametric form, using four different polynomials (from first order to fourth
order). Given the quasi-random assignment to treatment (where the treatment variable
is our dummy D), it is possible to infer causal effects. Yet, we have to keep in mind
that RDD identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE); namely, that the coefficients
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Figure 3.4: Correlation between contributions and environmental expenditures
that are isolated apply to cases where the margin of victory between the Democratic and
the Republican candidate is close to zero. The results reveal that the political party
of the governor has an impact on per capita environmental expenditures. The relevant
coefficient, β1, from (3.12) is always positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels, irrespective of the estimated polynomial, suggesting that results are stable across
alternative specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient ranges between 0.08 and 0.15,
suggesting that environmental expenditures increase by about 10% under Democratic
governors as compared to Republican ones. These results are confirmed in Figures 3.7a-
3.7c (see Appendix), graphically showing that there exists a discontinuity in environmental
expenditures at the threshold corresponding to margin of victory equal to zero.
Given that party affiliation matters for environmental expenditures, we investigate
whether this effect is heterogeneous across states, considering time-invariant variables ac-
counting for polluting industries’ presence and electoral incentives. As a first indication
of the presence of heterogeneous effects, we split our sample in two according to our in-
teraction variables. Table 3.5 shows results from our baseline RDD, dividing the sample
into subsamples of observations above and below the median value of states’ oil reserves
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Table 3.4: RDD, Governor’s Political Ideology and Environmental Expenditures
I Order II Order III Order IV Order
Democrat 0.078∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(2.84) (2.52) (2.73) (2.33)
Margin -0.035∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.017 -0.146
(-3.48) (-1.24) (-0.24) (-1.01)
Democrat*Margin 0.038∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.141 0.080
(2.74) (0.36) (-1.63) (0.45)
Margin2 - -0.001 0.013 -0.103
- (-0.19) (0.37) (-0.89)
Democrat*Margin2 - 0.00749 0.057 0.094
- (0.79) (1.33) (0.67)
Margin3 - - 0.002 -0.032
- - (0.44) (-1.00)
Democrat*Margin3 - - -0.010∗∗ 0.046
- - (-2.01) (1.18)
Margin4 - - - -0.003
- - - (-1.10)
Democrat*Margin4 - - - 0.001
- - - (0.40)
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at term level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes
significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
Margin of Victory is computed as the difference between the percent-
age of votes given to the Democratic candidates and the percentage
of votes given to the Republican candidate.
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(both unweighted and weighted by a state’s area) and percentage of “green” voters. Since
the states’ oil reserves are positively and significantly correlated with polluting industries’
contributions, such a measure can be used as a proxy for industrialists’ lobbying activity.
The results reported in Table 3.5 suggest that the party effect coming from our baseline
specification is heterogeneous across states’ abundance in oil resources. Indeed, the coeffi-
cient on the dummy variable D is larger in magnitude for observations below the median
than above the median, and only statistically significant for the former. In other words,
in oil-abundant states, the difference in environmental expenditures between Democratic
and Republican governors is smaller than for the complement states, which is likely driven
by the impact of polluting lobbies on governors’ decisions.
For the “green voters” variable, we find that the party effect is only relevant in mag-
nitude and statistically significant for observations below the median, namely for those
states where the number of memberships of environmental organizations is smaller. A pos-
sible explanation of this effect is that Republican governors, when their margin of victory
is small, tend to deviate from their preferred policy to attract environmentalists’ votes.
Finally, in Table 3.5, we evaluate our RDD specification for re-electable governors vs.
term-limited governors. The distribution of observations in the two samples is imbalanced,
since we have 1,210 observations where the governor is term limited vs. 406 observations
where he is re-electable. The magnitude of the party effect does not considerably change
between the two samples, even if the coefficient is only statistically significant for governors
not facing a term limit.
Overall, the Table 3.5 results point to the presence of heterogeneity of treatment effects.
Yet splitting the sample according to median values of interaction terms is arbitrary, and
we implement a heterogeneous RDD following the methodology proposed by Becker et al.
(2013), whose results are presented in Table 3.6, which incorporates several interaction
variables.
All four columns of results are based on fourth-order polynomial function and include
state and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the electoral term level. Col-
umn 1 adds to the baseline RDD specification the interaction term between our treatment
variable D and the logarithm of states’ oil reserves. The coefficient on the interaction
term confirms previous results, namely that the gap between Democratic and Republican
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Table 3.5: RDD, Sample Splitting According to Variables’ Median
(1) (2)
Oil Reserves>Median Oil Reserves<=Median
Democrat 0.112 0.194∗∗
(1.02) (2.24)
N 755 862
(1) (2)
Oil Res./Area>Median Oil Res./Area<=Median
Democrat 0.121 0.209∗∗
(1.19) (2.40)
N 825 792
(1) (2)
Green Voters>Median Green Voters<=Median
Democrat 0.003 0.209∗∗
(0.03) (2.50)
N 795 822
(1) (2)
Non Term Limited Term Limited
Democrat 0.170∗∗ 0.183
(2.41) (1.34)
N 1,210 406
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at term level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes
significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
All specifications include IV order polynomial functions of the
Democratic Margin of Victory and its interaction with the treat-
ment dummy variable D.
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Table 3.6: RDD with Heterogeneous Effects, Democratic Margin of Victory
Dependent Variable:
ln(Environmental Expenditures) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 0.164∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.185∗∗
(2.51) (2.50) (2.44) (2.33)
Democrat*Oil -0.005∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-2.07) (-2.15) (-4.72) (-4.64)
Democrat*Green Voters - -0.036 0.001 0.009
- (-0.67) (0.02) (0.16)
Democrat*Green Voters*Oil - - 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
- - (3.72) (3.70)
Democrat*Term Limit - - - 0.059
- - - (0.69)
Democrat*Oil*Term Limit - - - 0.002
- - - (0.48)
Democrat*Green*Term Limit - - - -0.035
- - - (-0.34)
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial Order IV IV IV IV
N 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
term level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. ***
denotes significance at 1%.
All specifications include IV order polynomial functions of the Democratic Mar-
gin of Victory and its interaction with the treatment dummy variable D.
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candidates shrinks as the amount of oil reserves increases. Based on these results, as oil
reserves increase by 10%, the difference in expenditures under Democratic and Republican
governors shrinks by 0.05. In column 2, we add the interaction term with a continuous
and time-invariant “green voters” variable, not finding any significant heterogeneous ef-
fect. However, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interacted term
between the Democratic governor dummy, the “green voters” variable and the logarithm of
Oil in Column 3 suggests that the presence of oil-related (polluting) productive activities
matters less as the number of environmentalist voters increases. One possible explanation
of these results is that, where the presence of polluting lobbies is stronger, environmental-
ists become more active through persuasion of politicians and the voting public. Finally,
from column 4, we do not find any significant difference in per capita environmental ex-
penditures between term limited governors and re-electable ones. This is in contrast with
previous literature (List and Sturm (2006), Fredriksson et al. (2013)).
Summarizing, our results from heterogeneous RDD suggest that governors take into
account both interests from industrial groups and, in some cases, preferences of “green”
voters when setting environmental policies, confirming the theoretical predictions outlined
in Section 3.3. Relying on our theoretical framework, the fact that Democratic governors
spend less on environmental conservation in those states where the presence of polluting
industries is stronger could have several explanations. First, industrial groups could have a
higher “stake” in securing their self-interest than environmental groups. Second, in states
where they are strong, polluting industries could act - aside from political contributions
- through public persuasion, shifting preferences of the median voter towards less envi-
ronmentally friendly policies. Finally, in states where the presence of polluting industries
is strong, Democratic candidates could have, on average, a less environmentally friendly
ideology, and be thus more responsive to lobbying pressures.
3.7 Robustness of the RDD
In this section, some tests on the robustness of our model, following Lee and Lemieux
(2010) and Becker et al. (2013), are presented. Figures and Tables showing results from
our robustness tests are reported in the Appendix of the paper. First, we want to rule
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out concerns related to potential persistence in our dependent variable. Indeed, as argued
by Beland (2015), there could be some state-specific trends influencing the probability
that Democratic governors are elected. To address this concern, we run two placebo tests,
where the baseline RDD without interaction effects is implemented on the dependent
variable from previous and subsequent electoral terms (term−1 and term+1). Our results,
summarized in Table 3.10, show that the coefficients on D are statistically insignificant at
conventional levels when lagged and anticipated environmental expenditures are considered
as dependent variables.
Second, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), we test whether some baseline co-
variates are continuous at the threshold. Since the RDD is analyzed as a randomized
experiment, one of its underlying assumptions is that all the “baseline characteristics”
should have the same distribution just above and just below the cutoff. If this condition
does not hold, then one could argue that there are some factors determining the treat-
ment variable at the threshold and the validity of the RDD would be questionable. To
test this condition, we perform “placebo” tests, replacing the dependent variable of our
RDD with baseline covariates. We rely on List and Sturm (2006) to select variables which
can be correlated with environmental expenditures, namely characteristics of states’ pop-
ulation (percentage of people under 17 years old and over 65 years old), personal income,
and population. Results from our “placebo” tests, displayed in Table 3.11, show that
none of the covariates is discontinuous at the threshold, providing further evidence of the
reasonableness of our RDD strategy.
In addition, we show evidence of the validity of our RDD with heterogeneous effects.
As explained by Becker et al. (2013), a fundamental assumption under which the HLATE
can be estimated is that interaction variables are continuous about the forcing variable (in
our case, the Democratic margin of victory) at the threshold. If this assumption is verified,
then we are sure to capture genuine variation in interaction variables. In order to test this
condition, we plot the average value of our interaction variables by categories of margin
of victory. The graphs are constructed in the same way as the ones on environmental
expenditures shown in Figures 3.7a-3.7c. Figures 3.8a-3.8c, reporting first and third order
polynomial functions for the logarithm of oil reserves, show that there is no evidence of a
discontinuity of this interaction variable at the threshold. Similarly, Figures 3.8c and 3.8d
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show that the discontinuity does not exist for the percentage of green voters.
Overall, this additional evidence confirms that our results are robust to the potential
weaknesses of the RDD.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of environmental policies in U.S. states, focus-
ing in particular on the party affiliation of governors and political pressure from interest
groups. We present a theoretical framework, where governors choose the optimal level of
environmental expenditures taking into account governors’ ideology, lobbying from both
environmentalist and industrialist interest groups, and preferences of the median voter.
The influence of these three factors is tested through an empirical analysis aimed at investi-
gating whether environmental expenditures within U.S. states differ when the governor is a
Democrat as compared to Republican. Moreover, we test whether governors deviate from
their preferred level of expenditures when they face pressures from interest groups and
electoral incentives. We employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to account for
the potential endogeneity of governors’ party affiliation, focusing on close elections, which
allows a causal effect to be inferred. Our results reveal that, when states are governed by
Democrats, environmental expenditures are, on average, higher than when a Republican
governor is elected. However, this effect turns out to be highly heterogeneous. By using
states’ oil reserves as an exogenous component of industrial lobbying power, we find that,
in oil-abundant states, Democratic governors decrease their environmental expenditures.
This suggests that the presence of industrial interest groups leads politicians to deviate
from their own ideology. Yet, this effect is mitigated when the presence of “green” voters
is strong, revealing that electoral incentives matter as well.
Our findings add additional empirical evidence to the political economic literature for
environmental policies. The focus on governors’ ideology relies in part on the theoretical
framework by List and Sturm (2006), where governors are defined as either “green” or
“brown”. Moreover, our findings are in line with the theoretical framework by Yu (2005),
arguing that a government modifies its preferences towards environmental policy according
to political contributions from industrialist groups and preferences of voters, which can
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be in turn influenced by environmental interest groups. According to our theoretical
framework and empirical results, the tendency of Democratic governors to deviate from
environmentally friendly policies where the presence of poluting industries is strong may be
due to a combination different mechanisms, viz., to the higher “stake” of industrial lobbies
in environmental expenditures where the presence of “dirty” industries is pervasive; the
persuasion actions of these interest groups towards voters; and to a less environmentally
friendly ideology of Democratic governors in these states, resulting in a stronger influence
of industrialist lobbies on the actual setting up of environmental expenditures.
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3.9 Appendix A
Figure 3.5: Contributions of NAICS sectors to toxic releases, 2015
Figure 3.6: Contributions of NAICS sectors to production-related waste managed, 2015
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Political Contributions, Linear Probability Model, 2010
Dependent Variable
Pr(Contributions>0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗∗ -
(2.08) (2.08) (2.06) -
Polluting Sector -0.164∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(-16.79) (-32.88) (-33.12) (-16.38)
Democrat*Polluting Sector -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(-8.17) (-8.15) (-8.14) (-8.00)
Polluting Sector*Oil 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(4.19) (4.02) (4.19) (4.36)
Democrat*Polluting Sector*Oil -0.003∗ -0.002 -0.003∗ -0.002
(-1.79) (-1.60) (-1.79) (-1.61)
House Member -0.252∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -
(-8.39) (-8.47) (-8.39) -
Senate Member -0.177∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -
(-5.72) (-5.78) (-5.71) -
General Election 0.266∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ -
(32.73) (11.73) (32.77) -
ln(Oil) - 0.003∗ - -
- (1.69) - -
Constant 0.304∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(9.10) (27.71) (16.16) (582.86)
State F.E. Yes No Yes -
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes No
Candidate F.E. No No No Yes
N 237,457 237,457 237,457 237,457
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
candidate level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. ***
denotes significance at 1%.
The variable Oil is weighted by states’ area.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Political Contributions, 2000
Dependent Variable
ln(Political Contributions) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat -0.067 -0.024 -0.067 -
(-0.87) (-0.29) (-0.87) -
Polluting Sector -1.026∗∗∗ -1.268∗∗∗ -1.270∗∗∗ -1.026∗∗∗
(-11.18) (-12.47) (-12.50) (-10.90)
Democrat*Polluting Sector -0.487∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗
(-7.40) (-7.41) (-7.41) (-7.16)
Polluting Sector*Oil 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(3.81) (3.54) (3.81) (3.79)
Democrat*Polluting Sector*Oil -0.022∗ -0.019 -0.022∗ -0.015∗∗
(-1.68) (-1.41) (-1.68) (-1.98)
House Member -3.779∗∗∗ -3.554∗∗∗ -3.778∗∗∗ -
(-9.17) (-7.72) (-9.17) -
Senate Member -2.980∗∗∗ -2.944∗∗∗ -2.979∗∗∗ -
(-7.23) (-6.28) (-7.22) -
General Election 2.189∗∗∗ 1.906∗∗∗ 2.188∗∗∗ -
(28.72) (9.34) (28.75) -
Ln(Oil) - 0.021 - -
- (1.42) - -
Constant 5.518∗∗∗ 7.376∗∗∗ 7.256∗∗∗ 3.798∗∗∗
(13.71) (16.32) (17.67) (438.95)
State F.E. Yes No Yes -
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes No
Candidate F.E. No No No Yes
N 196,752 196,752 196,752 196,752
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
candidate level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. ***
denotes significance at 1%.
The variable Oil is weighted by states’ area.
CHAPTER 3. ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES, IDEOLOGYAND LOBBYING83
Table 3.9: Determinants of Political Contributions, 2000: Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable
Pr(Political Contributions>0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -
(-1.01) (-0.61) (-1.01) -
Polluting Sector -0.123∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(-9.66) (-10.32) (-10.35) (-9.41)
Democrat*Polluting Sector -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(-6.64) (-6.64) (-6.64) (-6.43)
Polluting Sector*Oil 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(3.67) (3.46) (3.67) (3.63)
Democrat*Polluting Sector*Oil -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002∗
(-1.51) (-1.31) (-1.51) (-1.75)
House Member -0.265∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -
(-8.35) (-6.42) (-8.35) -
Senate Member -0.199∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -
(-6.25) (-5.24) (-6.25) -
General Election 0.267∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ -
(27.92) (10.04) (27.93) -
ln(Oil) - 0.002 - -
- (1.06) - -
Constant 0.590∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(17.01) (20.65) (22.26) (457.17)
State F.E. Yes No Yes -
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes No
Candidate F.E. No No No Yes
N 196,752 196,752 196,752 196,752
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
candidate level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. ***
denotes significance at 1%.
The variable Oil is weighted by states’ area.
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Figure 3.7: Environmental Expenditures by Democratic Margin of Victory
(a) I order polynomial
(b) II order polynomial
(c) III order polynomial
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Table 3.10: Placebo Test: RDD with Dependent Variable from Previous and Subsequent
Terms
ln(Env. Exp.)term−1 ln(Env. Exp.)term+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat 0.048 0.049 0.024 -0.040
(0.97) (0.84) (0.48) (-0.65)
Margin 0.076 -0.077 0.135∗ 0.237∗
(1.10) (-0.62) (1.93) (1.81)
Margin2 0.043 -0.092 0.071∗∗ 0.165
(1.31) (-0.93) (2.13) (1.46)
Margin3 0.005 -0.034 0.008∗ 0.036
(1.24) (-1.21) (1.94) (1.09)
Democrat*Margin -0.190∗∗ 0.123 -0.209∗∗ -0.172
(-2.21) (0.73) (-2.23) (-1.08)
Democrat*Margin2 0.009 0.005 -0.040 -0.246∗
(0.23) (0.04) (-0.93) (-1.73)
Democrat*Margin3 -0.011∗∗ 0.067∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.009
(-2.39) (1.82) (-2.16) (-0.23)
Margin4 - -0.004 - 0.003
- (-1.42) - (0.86)
Democrat*Margin4 - 0.000 - -0.005
- (0.12) - (-1.46)
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial Order III IV III IV
N 1,427 1,427 1,435 1,435
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at term level. * denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes
significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
Margin of Victory is computed as the difference between the percent-
age of votes given to the Democratic candidate and the percentage
of votes given to the Republican candidate.
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Table 3.11: Placebo Test: RDD with Baseline Covariates
% Pop.<17 yrs. % Pop.>65 yrs. ln(Population) Personal Income
Democrat 0.255 -0.082 -0.006 0.360
(1.18) (-0.46) (-0.21) (0.65)
Margin -0.465 -0.140 -0.050 -0.238
(-0.93) (-0.35) (-0.86) (-0.24)
Margin2 -0.417 0.122 -0.043 -0.073
(-1.04) (0.38) (-0.95) (-0.09)
Margin3 -0.125 0.057 -0.011 0.026
(-1.10) (0.62) (-0.87) (0.12)
Margin4 -0.012 0.006 -0.001 0.005
(-1.14) (0.71) (-0.79) (0.26)
Democrat*Margin 0.391 0.367 0.032 1.021
(0.64) (0.77) (0.44) (0.70)
Democrat*Margin2 0.476 -0.200 0.057 -0.845
(0.99) (-0.51) (0.91) (-0.74)
Democrat*Margin3 0.107 -0.047 0.007 0.250
(0.81) (-0.45) (0.46) (0.82)
Democrat*Margin4 0.014 -0.006 0.001 -0.029
(1.17) (-0.67) (0.79) (-1.11)
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial Order IV IV IV IV
N 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617
Notes: t statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at term level. *
denotes significance at 10%. ** denotes significance at 5%. *** denotes significance at 1%.
Margin of Victory is computed as the difference between the percentage of votes given to the
Democratic candidate and the percentage of votes given to the Republican candidate.
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Figure 3.8: Interaction Variables and Democratic Margin of Victory
(a) ln(Oil) and margin of victory, I order poly-
nomial
(b) ln(Oil) and margin of victory, III order poly-
nomial
(c) % of “green” voters and margin of victory, I
order polynomial
(d) % of “green” voters and margin of victory,
III order polynomial
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